Jihadist online communication and Finland by Malkki, Leena & Pohjoinen, Matti
Jihadist online 
communication and 
Finland
Leena Malkki and Matti Pohjonen 
Translated from Finnish
Internal security | Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 2019:29
Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 2019:29 
Jihadist online communication and Finland 
 
 
Ministry of the Interior, Helsinki 2019 
 
  
 
 
Ministry of the Interior 
 
ISBN PDF: 978-952-324-300-2 
Helsinki 2019 
 
Description sheet 
Published by Ministry of the Interior 23 August 2019 
Authors Leena Malkki and Matti Pohjonen 
Title of publication Jihadist online communication and Finland 
Series and publication 
number 
Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 2019:29 
Register number SMDno-2018-45 Subject Internal security 
ISBN PDF 978-952-324-300-2 ISSN PDF 2490-077X 
Website address URN http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN: 978-952-324-300-2 
Pages 90 Language English 
Keywords extremist movements, online communication, radicalisation, terrorism 
Abstract 
This study investigates jihadist online communication related to Finland in 2014–2018. In particular, it examines the visibility 
of Finland and persons connected to Finland in jihadist communication and investigates what kinds of content persons living 
in Finland have produced and disseminated online.  
During the investigated period, jihadist online communication related to Finland was more prevalent than ever before. Finns 
were mentioned in ISIS materials, and persons living in Finland produced and disseminated jihadist content in the Finnish 
language. This reflects the broader development of the jihadist activities connected to Finland. The amount of content must 
not be exaggerated, however, as the amount of content and online activities connected to Finland were still relatively 
minimal when compared internationally.  
Over the past three years, jihadist online communication has migrated to closed platforms, as technology companies 
actively removed public content inciting people to violence. This means that openly jihadist activity online has largely slowed 
down for the time being, and this is also the case with content related to Finland. Jihadist online communication, however, 
has not ceased entirely. The study found signs that jihadist online communication is still occurring via closed, encrypted 
channels.  
The study was carried out together with the Jihadism in Finland study. 
Publisher Ministry of the Interior 
Publication sales/ 
Distributed by 
Online version: julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi 
Publication sales: julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi 
Kuvailulehti 
Julkaisija Sisäministeriö 23.8.2019 
Tekijät Leena Malkki ja Matti Pohjonen 
Julkaisun nimi Jihadistinen verkkoviestintä ja Suomi 
Julkaisusarjan nimi 
ja numero 
Sisäministeriön julkaisuja 2019:29 
Diaari/hankenumero SMDno-2018-45 Teema Sisäinen turvallisuus 
ISBN PDF 978-952-324-300-2 ISSN PDF 2490-077X 
URN-osoite http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-300-2 
Sivumäärä 90 Kieli englanti 
Asiasanat ääriliikkeet, verkkoviestintä, radikalisoituminen, terrorismi 
Tiivistelmä 
Tutkimus käsittelee Suomeen liittyvää jihadistista verkkoviestintää vuosina 2014⎼2018. Siinä kartoitetaan erityisesti 
Suomen ja Suomeen liittyvien henkilöiden esiintymistä jihadistisessa viestinnässä sekä sitä, millaista aineistoa Suomessa 
asuneet henkilöt ovat tuottaneet ja levittäneet verkossa.  
Ajanjakson alkupuolella Suomeen liittyvää jihadistista verkkoviestintää oli enemmän kuin koskaan aiemmin. Suomalaisia 
esiintyi Isisin aineistoissa, ja Suomessa asuneet henkilöt tuottivat ja levittivät jihadistista aineistoa myös suomeksi. Tämä 
heijastaa Suomeen liittyvän jihadistisen liikehdinnän yleistä kehittymistä. Aineiston määrää ei tule kuitenkaan liioitella, sillä 
Suomeen liittyvän viestinnän määrä oli edelleen kansainvälisesti katsoen verrattain vähäinen.  
Viimeisen kolmen vuoden aikana jihadistinen verkkoviestintä on siirtynyt suljetuille alustoille, kun teknologiayritykset ovat 
aktiivisesti poistaneet avointa väkivaltaan yllyttävää aineistoa. Tämä tarkoittaa, että avoimen jihadistisen verkkoviestinnän 
aika on tällä erää myös Suomeen liittyvän aineiston osalta pitkälti ohi. Suomeen kytkeytyvä jihadistinen verkkoviestintä ei 
ole kuitenkaan todennäköisesti täysin tyrehtynyt. Tutkimuksen yhteydessä havaittiin merkkejä siitä, että sitä saattaa 
edelleen olla suljetuilla ja salatuilla kanavilla.  
Tutkimus on tehty samanaikaisesti Jihadistinen liikehdintä Suomessa -tutkimuksen kanssa. 
Kustantaja Sisäministeriö 
Julkaisun 
myynti/jakaja 
Sähköinen versio: julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi 
Julkaisumyynti: julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi 
 Presentationsblad 
Utgivare Inrikesministeriet 3.4.2019 
Författare Leena Malkki och Matti Pohjonen 
Publikationens titel  Jihadistisk webbkommunikation och Finland 
Publikationsseriens 
namn och nummer 
Inrikesministeriets publikationer 2019:29 
Diarie-/ 
projektnummer 
SMDno-2018-45 Tema Inre säkerhet 
ISBN PDF 978-952-324-300-2 ISSN PDF 2490-077X 
URN-adress http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-300-2 
Sidantal 90 Språk engelska 
Nyckelord extremiströrelser, webbkommunikation, radikalisering, terrorism 
Referat 
Undersökningen behandlar jihadistisk webbkommunikation som gäller Finland 2014⎼2018.  Den kartlägger i synnerhet hur 
Finland och personer med anknytning till Finland förekommer i den jihadistiska kommunikationen samt hurdant material 
personer som bott i Finland har producerat och spridit på webben.  
I början av tidsperioden förekom det mer jihadistisk webbkommunikation som gällde Finland än någonsin tidigare. Det fanns 
belägg på finländare i ISIS material, och personer som bott i Finland producerade och spred jihadistiskt material också på 
finska. Detta reflekterar den allmänna utvecklingen av jihadistiska rörelser med anknytning till Finland. Man ska dock inte 
överdriva mängden material eftersom mängden kommunikation som gäller Finland fortfarande var rätt så liten internationellt 
sett.  
Under de tre senaste åren har den jihadistiska webbkommunikationen övergått till slutna plattformar i och med att 
teknologiföretag aktivt har raderat material som öppet uppviglar till våld. Detta innebär att tiden för öppen jihadistisk 
webbkommunikation för den här gången till stor del är över också i fråga om material som gäller Finland. Den jihadistiska 
webbkommunikation som är förknippad med Finland har dock antagligen inte helt tystnat. I samband med undersökningen 
upptäcktes tecken på att den kan finnas kvar i stängda och krypterade kanaler.  
Undersökningen har gjorts samtidigt med undersökningen Jihadistiska rörelser i Finland. 
 
Förläggare Inrikesministeriet 
Beställningar/ 
distribution 
Elektronisk version: julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi 
Beställningar: julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi 
 
  
 
 
  
Contents 
Executive summary .......................................................................................... 11 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 13 
1.1 Research topic and objectives .................................................................................... 14 
1.2 Previous research ....................................................................................................... 17 
1.3 Data and methods ....................................................................................................... 18 
1.4 Limitations of the study................................................................................................ 21 
1.5 Research ethics .......................................................................................................... 22 
2 Jihadist online communication as an international 
phenomenon ............................................................................................ 24 
2.1 Jihadist online communication and the changing media environment ........................ 24 
2.2 Al-Qaeda ..................................................................................................................... 28 
2.3 Al-Shabaab ................................................................................................................. 30 
2.4 ISIS ............................................................................................................................. 32 
2.5 Jihadist online content and violent radicalisation ........................................................ 38 
2.6 Future trends in jihadist online communication ........................................................... 41 
3 Jihadist online communication and Finland ......................................... 43 
3.1 Finland in jihadist movements’ key online content ...................................................... 44 
3.1.1 References to Finland in jihadist online magazines................................... 44 
3.1.2 References to Finland in jihadist videos .................................................... 50 
3.2 Jihadist online content produced in Finnish or by persons with a link to 
Finland ........................................................................................................................ 54 
3.2.1 Militant jihadists ......................................................................................... 56 
3.2.1.1 Facebook ............................................................................ 56 
3.2.1.2 Twitter ................................................................................. 61 
3.2.1.3 Ask.fm and other online forums .......................................... 64 
  
3.2.2 Producers, disseminators and translators ................................................. 67 
3.2.2.1 Activities of @Mujahid4life account on Twitter .................... 68 
3.2.2.2 Hussein al-Maadidi’s writings .............................................. 69 
3.2.2.3 An-Nida ............................................................................... 70 
3.2.2.4 Writings on Islamtieto website ............................................. 75 
3.2.2.5 Dissemination of radical religious  material of a 
more generic nature ............................................................ 76 
3.2.2.6 Jihadist ‘memes’ and other visual content .......................... 79 
3.2.3 Telegram and encrypted channels ............................................................ 81 
4 Conclusions ............................................................................................. 82 
4.1 Key findings ................................................................................................................. 82 
4.2 Significance of jihadist online communication for Finland ........................................... 84 
4.3 Needs for further research .......................................................................................... 88 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 
 
9 
 
 
TO THE READER 
The development of jihadism in Finland has sparked a heated debate in recent years, 
especially in the context of the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Efforts to prevent violent 
extremism have expanded considerably in the 2010s. Consequently, the demand for 
evidence-based information on jihadist activity specifically related to Finland has 
increased strongly.  
This report commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior was produced to meet this 
knowledge need, in particular regarding jihadist online communication. While its 
specific purpose is to support the efforts to prevent violent extremism in Finland, the 
authors hope that it will also be of more general interest to readers among the wider 
public. 
This report was produced concurrently and by the same research group as the report 
titled Jihadism in Finland, which analyses the general development of jihadist activity 
in Finland in the 2010s.  
The authors would like to extend their warmest thanks to all those who were 
interviewed for the report and who assisted in its writing in different ways. Our thanks 
go to the steering group led by Tarja Mankkinen (Ministry of the Interior). The group's 
comments were a great help in different stages of the study. The members of the 
steering group were Marko Juntunen (University of Helsinki), Timo Kilpeläinen 
(National Police Board), Marja Tiilikainen (Migration Institute of Finland) and Oussama 
Yousfi (Radinet).  
We would also like to thank our research assistants Fairuz Muthana, Taru Tervahauta 
and Lauri von Pfaler as well as our colleagues who commented on the draft reports at 
different stages.  
Leena Malkki and Matti Pohjonen 
University of Helsinki, Centre for European Studies 
March 2019
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Executive summary 
This study focuses on jihadist online communication in 2014–2018 from the 
perspective of Finland. In particular, it examines and analyses the visibility of Finland 
and persons connected to Finland in jihadist online communication and investigates 
the types of content persons who are or were living in Finland have produced and 
disseminated content on different online platforms and channels. The report focuses 
on jihadist material that was openly available online during this period. It also contains 
a section describing the development of jihadist online communication more 
generally, thus helping to put observations in a broader international context.  
Up till the early 2010s, Finland was conspicuous by its almost total absence from 
jihadist content. This situation changed in the early stages of the conflict in Syria, at 
which time jihadist online communication became more prolific in Western countries. 
Around the same time, Finland also became visible in international jihadist 
discussions for the first time. During the early years of the conflict, the volume of 
jihadist online communication related to Finland was higher than ever before. This 
volume should not be exaggerated, however, as the quantity of online communication 
linked to Finland remained relatively small by international comparison. 
Finland has been mentioned and persons coming from Finland have appeared a 
number of times in ISIS publications and videos. Persons originating from Finland 
have mainly featured in stories and videos intended for the Western public in a wider 
sense. In ISIS publications, Finland is also cited as one on the long list of the 
organisation’s enemies and a heathen country where orthodox Muslims are not 
understood.   
References to Finland in jihadist groups’ publications have been few and far between, 
and they do not add up to a clear picture of Finland as an important target. It is likely 
that ISIS has used persons from Finland in jihadist publications and videos mainly to 
target its communication at broader Western audiences. Numerous persons 
originating from other Western countries also appear in similar stories and videos. 
These stories and videos offer a new point of comparison, however, which may make 
identification with jihadist activity seem more natural also in Finland. At this stage, the 
actual impact this has ultimately had on the development of jihadism in Finland should 
be considered as an open question. 
In addition to established jihadist groups, jihadist online content has also been 
produced independently by their supporters. Many of those who have travelled to 
Syria and Iraq from Finland have been active on the social media. In addition to 
everyday messages typical of social media discussions, this activity has included 
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reporting on local conditions, responding to questions, and also encouraging others to 
go to Syria or Iraq. The communication has also contained some threats against 
Finland and, for example, against Shia Muslims. While the preferred channels for 
these activities appear to have been Facebook and Twitter, such content was also 
found on other discussion platforms.   
Persons who are and were living in Finland have disseminated and, in some cases, 
also produced jihadist content in the Finnish language. The majority of the content 
available and distributed outside the social media, including on websites and in blogs 
or online discussion forums, has been translated from other languages. The volume of 
Finnish content has been quite modest, and as far as we can conclude, it is unlikely to 
have attracted a large number of readers.   
The volume of open jihadist online communication has dropped significantly in the last 
three years, as technology companies have started actively deleting content inciting 
or advocating violence. Apart from a few exceptions, the content discussed in this 
study is no longer available online. The golden days of open jihadist online 
communication are now mostly over, and this also applies to content related to 
Finland or provided in Finnish. While online content related to Finland has almost 
completely disappeared from public platforms, this does not mean that it no longer 
exists elsewhere. As disseminating such content publicly has become more difficult, 
jihadist online communication has moved to closed and encrypted channels. The 
study found signs indicating that jihadist content related to Finland has been shared 
and interaction associated with it has also occurred, and may occur still, on these 
closed and encrypted channels.  
The impact of jihadist online communication on Finland is not limited to content 
directly linked to Finland, and content in which “Finland is mentioned” in some way is 
not always automatically the most significant for Finland. Online communication is 
produced in countless other languages, and it is frequently also consumed in 
languages other than the audience’s native language. Rather than living in the same 
country, the producers and consumers of jihadist online communication typically are 
part of the complex online milieu of international movements.  
Interpersonal relationships, even highly significant ones, may be established through 
online communication. This possibility may facilitate attachment to jihadist activity, 
especially for people for whom it is difficult to find persons with a similar ideological 
predisposition close by. At the same time it should be noted that, according to 
research findings, face-to-face interaction still almost always plays a significant role in 
recruitment to jihadist activism.  
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1 Introduction 
In his book titled The Management of Savagery (2004), Abu Bakr Naji 1, a key 
strategist of modern jihadism, declared that the global jihadist movement should 
exploit the new opportunities provided by new media to wage psychological warfare 
against Western countries. This book has provided extensive inspiration for the 
current wave of violent terrorism.2 Around the same time Abu Musab al Suri, one of al-
Qaeda’s strategic thinkers, also proposed in his book The Global Islamic Resistance 
Call a new type of information warfare, in which communication technology would be 
used to spread the message of the movement and drum up support for it.3 It is likely 
that the general public is more familiar, however, with the new generation of jihadist 
communication as violent videos and online recruitment by ISIS encouraging young 
people to Syria and Iraq have gained wider publicity.4  
The new opportunities offered by the social media have had a crucial impact on the 
development of jihadist activity in Europe. Content inciting violence that can be easily 
accessed on the Internet and the possibilities for interaction offered by the social 
media are considered one of the reasons for thousands of young people travelling to 
the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq. The new communication channels have also been 
used in numerous terrorist attacks in an attempt to amplify the psychological shock 
effect of violent attacks by such means as social media campaigns and live streaming 
on Facebook.5  
While the countermeasures of the authorities and technology companies have 
succeeded in reducing the volume of jihadist content publicly available online and on 
the social media in recent years, terrorist organisations have also shown an ability to 
                                                     
 
1 In this report, Arabic names and terms have been written with the established spellings used in 
the news. For terms that do not as yet have established spellings in Finnish public discussion, the 
spellings used in English research literature have been selected. For names that organisations, 
media or persons use of themselves (such as foreign fighters’ noms de guerre), the spelling 
preferred by the relevant party is used. 
2  See Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the 
Umma Will Pass (Cambridge, Mass.: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard 
University, 2006), https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-
savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf. 
3 See e.g. M.W. Zackie Masoud, "An Analysis of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s “Call to Global Islamic 
Resistance”, Journal of Strategic Security 6, no 1 (2013), 1–18.  A good general review of relevant 
academic literature can also be found in Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Khaderbhai, 
Research perspectives on online radicalisation: A Literature Review 2006–2016 (VOX-Pol 
Network of Excellence, 2017).  
4 Charlie Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy 
(London: Quilliam, 2015). 
5 Maura Conway and Joseph Dillon, Case study: future trends: live-streaming terrorist attacks  
(VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017), http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Live-
streaming_FINAL.pdf. 
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adapt their operating methods to the rapidly changing digital media environment. 
Encrypted messaging services, including Telegram, have grown in popularity as 
means of distributing content and recruiting supporters.6 Researchers have also 
warned of the increasing use of the “darknet” in planning violent attacks and 
disseminating online communication supporting them.7 
Historically, Finland’s role in international jihadism has been marginal. This has also 
been true of jihadist communication, whether we mean references to Finland, the 
volume of content produced in Finnish, or the role of persons living in Finland who 
have produced or disseminated content. In recent years, however, there have been 
indications of a change in this situation. While Finland’s role remains clearly marginal, 
persons who have lived in Finland have been seen in ISIS videos and publications, for 
example, and jihadist content has been available in Finnish on the Internet.  
The purpose of this research project was to examine the links between jihadist online 
communication and Finland. This is the first study on the subject conducted in 
Finland. The report also aims to serve as a more extensive introduction to the 
development of jihadist online communication for those who are not yet familiar with 
the discussion and literature on this topic in the Finnish context.8  
The study was commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior with the purpose of 
supporting efforts to prevent violent extremism. It was produced simultaneously with 
the study on jihadist activism and Finland presented in the report Jihadism in Finland 
and carried out by the same research group.  
1.1 Research topic and objectives 
In this report, we use the term jihadist online communication to refer to the object of 
the study. The study focuses on (Salafi) jihadist communication which accepts the use 
of violence and the actors and networks producing and disseminating it. In short, 
                                                     
 
6 Ahmat Shehabat and Teodor Mitew, "Black-boxing the Black Flag: Anonymous Sharing 
Platforms and ISIS Content Distribution Tactics",  Perspectives of Terrorism 12, no 1 (2018), 81–
99. 
7 Gabriel Weinmann, “Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web”, Perspectives of Terrorism 10, no 3 
(2016), 40–44. 
8 Useful works on the topic in more general terms include Christina Archetti, Understanding 
Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2013); Akil Awan, Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, Radicalisation and Media: 
Connectivity and Terrorism in the New Media Ecology (London: Routledge, 2011); Anne Aly, 
Stuart Mcdonald, Lee Jarvis and Tomas Chen, Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on 
Terrorism and the Internet (London: Routledge, 2016). 
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jihadism in this report refers to the activity and ideology of such movements as al-
Qaeda and ISIS. For a more extensive discussion of the history, objectives and 
worldview of jihadist movements and their relationship with a number of other 
phenomena, see the report Jihadism in Finland.  
In this context, online communication refers to communication intended to promote 
jihadist ideology and/or to support actors and networks disseminating it. The study 
focuses on content of this type, particularly on the Internet and social media. In 
academic research, the term violent online political extremism is often used to 
describe such content.9 This includes the communication of violent movements 
themselves as well as content sympathetic to such movements produced 
independently by their supporters. 
Jihadist movements engage in many types of activities online, including fundraising. 
However, this study only focuses on that part of communication which is targeted at a 
wider public or supporters and which thus presumably strives to attract more 
extensive attention to the movement’s activities, or to recruit more people to violent 
activity or otherwise support it. In other words, rather than analysing the internal 
communication of jihadist groups (related to planning attacks or coordinating their 
activities, for example), the study focuses on communication that has been publicly 
available online. The analysed content includes communication between supporters 
which is easily visible to outsiders (e.g. threads under open social media accounts).  
In keeping with the commission, the objective of the study is to map the online 
communication of jihadist movements and networks with particular reference to 
Finland, as well as to explore the way in which this communication has changed in 
recent years. As this is a highly international phenomenon, the report also contains an 
extensive background section, which describes the international development and 
main features of jihadist communication in more general terms.  
The focus on Finland means that particular subjects of the study are a) content 
produced in or translated into Finnish, b) participation of persons who live/have lived 
in Finland in producing and disseminating content, and c) content that discusses 
Finland, Finnish society and politics, and persons who live or have lived in Finland. 
The study also contains analyses of the type of jihadist content relevant to Finland 
that has been discussed in Finnish-language media.  
                                                     
 
9 See e.g. the VOX-Pol network’s description of the term “violent online political extremism: 
www.voxpol.eu/about.  
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The key questions of the study are: 
 How have Finland and Finnish people been discussed in jihadist online 
communication? 
 What type of content has been produced and disseminated by persons who 
live, or have lived, in Finland? Which channels have been used for this? 
 What were the key messages of the produced and disseminated content? 
What type of images were used in the communication? How does the 
communication discuss issues and events that relate to Finland in more 
general terms?  
 In keeping with the commission, the main focus of the study is on the period 
2014–2018. It also looks at a few preceding years, during which the publicly 
available content was more prolific and/or easier to find. The study mainly 
concentrates on Finnish and English content, which has the potential to reach 
the widest target audience in Finland. The study also contains a more limited 
discussion of content published in other languages.  
 Persons living/having lived in Finland refer to all inhabitants of Finland, 
including the so-called native Finns. Numerous people of Finnish birth and 
with Finnish roots have participated in jihadist activism in Finland in general 
as well as in jihadist online communication.  
 The study does not take a stand on what should be done about jihadist online 
communication. Neither does it deal with the detailed content of the 
communication and, for example, the way in which persons who travelled to 
Syria and Iraq themselves justified the reasons for their decisions and their 
religious and political views. An earlier study already exists on the latter 
theme.10 The objective of this study was to provide an overview of jihadist 
online communication linked to Finland.  
                                                     
 
10 Marko Juntunen, Karin Creutz-Sundblom & Juha Saarinen, Suomesta Syyrian ja Irakin 
konfliktikentälle suuntautuva liikkuvuus. Publication series of the Government’s analysis, 
assessment and research activities no 43/2016. 
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1.2 Previous research  
While jihadist communication emerged more extensively as a topic of public 
discussion in Finland along with the media visibility attracted by ISIS, the roots of this 
phenomenon go back to the time before Internet and social media use became 
widespread. Examples include tapes used to spread the sermons of spiritual leader 
Khomeini during the Iranian revolution, which contributed to the formation of the 
ideological foundation of the Islamist revolution in the country.11  Al-Qaeda leaders 
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri also became known in the 1990s and 
2000s for distributing videos and tapes among their supporters and, through them, 
also to international news channels.12   
When talking about jihadist communication today, however, we usually refer to the 
more widespread use of the Internet and social media for jihadist movements’ 
communicative purposes. Research in this topic has been exceptionally active in the 
last five years. Studies have looked at the media use of different jihadist movements 
(especially al-Qaeda and ISIS) and its role in their activities, including spreading 
religious doctrines, dissemination of educational and teaching materials, information 
acquisition, fundraising, planning of attacks, recruitment of fighters and attracting new 
supporters.13    
Research in jihadist communication has drawn from the theories and methods of a 
number of different disciplines, including political research, criminology, history, 
sociology and media research. Research in this subject has been particularly active in 
the United States, the Great Britain and France, where jihadist activity has had a more 
prominent role in both public discussion and policy-making than in countries such as 
Finland.   
No research that maps this phenomenon from the Finnish perspective has so far been 
conducted. Research in jihadism and Finland has in general been virtually non-
existent. References to jihadist communication in Finnish publications have so far 
been almost exclusively limited to some comments issued by the Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service and news items published when Finland has been cited or 
persons who had lived in Finland have appeared in jihadist communication.   
                                                     
 
11 Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution: 
Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution (St. Paul: Minnesota University Press, 1994). 
12 Flagg Miller, The Audacious Ascetic: What the Bin Laden Tapes Reveal About al-Qaʿida 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2015). See also Martin Rudner, “Electronic Jihad: The Internet as Al 
Qaeda's Catalyst for Global Terror”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no 1 (2010), 10–23. 
13 See e.g. Aly et al., Violent Extremism Online. 
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It has also been typical of research in jihadism in Europe in a broader context that it 
either focuses on such activity at the international level or looks at developments 
mainly in those countries that have traditionally had the strongest jihadist networks 
(especially France and the Great Britain). Research in countries on the periphery of 
this activity (such as Finland), on the other hand, has been far less active. Studies in 
which jihadist communication is examined from the specific perspective of a certain 
country have also been few and far between. For these reasons, this study is rather 
exceptional in the field of academic research.  
1.3 Data and methods 
Researching jihadist movements is rarely easy because violent groups are unwilling 
to reveal details about their activities to outsiders. Researching jihadist 
communication intended for the general public is slightly easier, as it focuses on the 
very part of the movements’ activity to which they wish to draw attention. When we 
move from the content of the communication to its producers and its methods of 
dissemination, however, we soon encounter the data challenges typical of research in 
jihadism.  
Jihadist online communication had its short golden era around the period extending 
from 2013 to 2015. In the early years of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, jihadist 
communication on the social media proliferated rapidly, and especially pro-ISIS 
content was widely and quite openly available on such channels as Twitter and 
Facebook. This offered researchers unique possibilities for studying the content and 
social networks, as the authorities paid much less attention to this content in the early 
days than they did only a few years later. During this period, researchers were able to 
collect unique primary data on the activities and communication strategies of different 
jihadist movements on a much larger scale than ever before. 
The situation has since changed significantly, as much more stringent monitoring of 
social media content has been introduced, and authorities and technology companies 
have become very quick in removing content inciting violence. This is why content 
from the years of prolific jihadist social media communication is no longer publicly 
available, and new content is equally difficult to access.  New content continues to be 
published and disseminated on the social media with new profiles, but this content is 
removed as soon as it goes up, and consequently it is not only difficult to find for 
research purposes but also relatively insignificant, given its short life span. 
Rather than ending completely, however, jihadist communication in the online 
environment has increasingly moved to closed, encrypted channels. Forming a 
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comprehensive overview of the content and users of these channels is extremely 
difficult. In order to follow the types of content and uses found on these encrypted 
channels, profiles covering the researcher’s identity and profession and often also 
active participation in the discussions are required. This raises difficult questions in 
terms of research ethics and requires high amounts of time and resources.14 
Monitoring social medial discussions has thus been a full-time job for researchers in 
this field for many years. Such understanding and experience acquired over the years 
has been quite essential for an ability to follow the discussions in the current, rapidly 
changing jihadist media environment. The restricted access to the content has been a 
particularly acute challenge when studying jihadist online communication related to 
countries like Finland, as in these cases the volume of content is low to begin with. 
Not only is the content more difficult to access but its use is also hampered by the fact 
that technology companies have imposed more stringent practices on sharing open 
data with researchers. Previously, social media content was much easier to access as 
it could be downloaded directly through the application programming interfaces (APIs) 
of different social media companies (including Twitter or Facebook). This method 
allowed for the collection of large-scale social media data for research purposes. In 
practice, it meant that public social media content could be downloaded automatically, 
for example from Twitter or Facebook, using different search words without having to 
first save the content manually as screen captures or in other ways and going through 
it post by post. This has now become considerably more difficult, hampering 
especially the acquisition of the large data sets important for research purposes and 
the use of research methods requiring larger data sets.15  
The following data were used in this study: 
 Social media profiles – this includes Facebook profiles and Twitter activity of 
fighters who left Finland for Syria and Iraq. Whereas a small part of this 
content is still available online, most of it came from the researchers’ personal 
archives. The researchers also had access to social media content collected 
by Sara Rigatelli, an Yle reporter, who has actively followed the accounts of 
foreign fighters.  
                                                     
 
14 See e.g. Nico Prucha, “IS and the Jihadist Information Highway – Projecting Influence and 
Religious Identity via Telegram”, Perspectives of Terrorism 10, no 6,  (2010), 48–58. 
15 Joe Whittaker, Methodological Problems in Online Radicalisation (VOX-Pol Network of 
Excellence, 2017), https://www.voxpol.eu/methodological-problems-online-radicalisation/.   
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 International Twitter archives – The researchers had access to international 
Twitter archives. The most extensive one of these is TRAC’s Shadows of ISIS 
data set containing 9.3 million tweets related to ISIS. 
 Finnish online forums – This part of the data consists of Finnish online forums 
and websites on which jihadist content was published in 2014–2018 (including 
An-Nida). Most of this content has also since been taken down, and content 
stored in the researchers’ personal archives was thus used. The data has 
been complemented by using archive.org. 
 Jihadist movements’ own media production – For the purposes of this study, 
some of the best-known key jihadist online magazines, videos etc. were 
examined, with a particular focus on ISIS media production directed at 
Western audiences (e.g. Dabiq, Rumiyah, Al-Amaq, Al-Naba and Inspire). 
 Videos – the content studied also includes videos. Most of these videos have 
been or are still available on YouTube or similar video services and in 
researchers’ archives. The videos were mainly identified on the basis of social 
media profiles, news coverage and interviews.  
To support the analysis of the data, the following sources were used in addition to 
research literature: 
 Interviews – Interviews with Muslim community members and public 
authorities, among others, conducted together with the Jihadism in Finland 
study. Additionally, leading international researchers of jihadist online 
communication were consulted to find out what aspects linked to Finland have 
emerged in their data. 
 Legal documents – The study also examined documents related to court 
proceedings and criminal investigations to the extent they addressed the 
suspects’ Internet and social media use. 
 News content in mainstream media – Features on content and links related to 
Finland in jihadist online communication found in key Finnish news media 
were collected for the study. The studies Jihadist online communication and 
Finland and Jihadism in Finland worked together to acquire this content. The 
study also included an analysis of how Finland has been represented in the 
main-stream Arabic-language media in the Middle East.  
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1.4 Limitations of the study 
The study aimed to produce as comprehensive and careful an analysis as was 
possible within the limits of the available resources. At the same time, it is obvious 
that many gaps in our knowledge remain to be filled by future research projects.  
The most important limitations affecting the study originate from the difficulties of 
obtaining data described above. While the researchers had access to a high volume 
of social media content that is no longer available online, it is unlikely to cover all the 
content related to Finland that was posted online. In practice, this limitation is relevant 
to all  historical research in which jihadist social media data is used and where it was 
not possible to collect the data for the needs of the project before the more stringent 
practices were introduced. The use of archived material creates additional challenges 
in terms of research methodology, as it only provides a limited sample of social media 
threads, which often are dynamic and change rapidly. Additionally, analysing social 
media posts and ‘likes’ based on archived material is much more difficult and 
restrictive. 
Another limitation of the study was its focus on openly available content. This means 
that online communication on closed channels, which today have an important role, 
was excluded from the study. While research on communication on closed channels is 
undeniably important, we should at the same time be aware of the fact that the closed 
channels are a different form of communication also from the perspective of the 
jihadist movements themselves. The difficulties associated with tracing and following 
the content described above also apply to the potential audiences of jihadist online 
communication. Discussions on Telegram, for example, often cannot be followed 
unless you receive a link or an invitation to the right channels and groups.16 Moreover, 
these numerous channels and groups are in constant flux. Consequently, the visibility 
and accessibility of content produced through Telegram, for instance, are essentially 
more restricted and disseminating such content is more difficult than it was on 
Facebook and especially Twitter. This has also been noted by supporters of jihadism 
on Telegram. In practice, stricter monitoring of the social media has driven actors with 
                                                     
 
16 The channels of the Telegram messaging app are intended for receiving messages, and they 
can only be used by the administrators of these channels when communicating with their followers. 
Group chats, on the other hand, are discussions in which all members can participate. Groups 
further include normal groups (up to 200 members) and supergroups (up to 100,000 members). 
Additionally, both of these group types may be either public (they can be found by search engines) 
or closed (channels or groups that cannot be found without a precise address).  Telegram also 
has a chat feature through which the members can engage in encrypted communication. For a 
useful review of the realities of research related to Telegram, see Mia Bloom, Hicham Tiflati and 
John Horgan, “Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform”, Terrorism and Political Violence (2017). 
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ISIS and al-Qaeda sympathies back to closed discussion forums, or their own ‘echo 
chambers’, which many of them experience as unfortunate.  
In other words, the use of closed channels has made online communication more 
fragmented and probably less effective in reaching wider audiences. Furthermore, the 
communication mostly comprises interaction between those who already are involved 
in the activities. On Telegram, assessing the number and identities of those following 
the chats is also made more difficult by the fact that a significant number of 
subscribers to jihadist channels are likely to be researchers, journalists and 
intelligence service representatives.17 
1.5 Research ethics 
In research conducted in keeping with academic principles, questions of research 
ethics must always also be addressed. Careful consideration of research ethics is 
particularly essential when the research concerns societally sensitive topics. This 
project follows the research ethics principles of human sciences, as does its sister 
project on jihadism in Finland. A preliminary evaluation of both projects was requested 
from the University of Helsinki Ethical Review Board in the Humanities and Social and 
Behavioural Sciences. 
In terms of its methods and data, the study involves rather commonplace social 
science research in many ways.  In the use and storage of interview material, 
principles discussed in greater detail in the report Jihadism in Finland were followed. 
In addition, the way Internet and social media content should be handled in this report 
needed to be considered carefully.  While the social media and Internet content used 
in it originally was public and thus openly accessible, in this report all content 
collected from such sources is discussed anonymously and without revealing 
information that would violate the privacy of individuals. An exception to this rule is 
made for persons whose participation in jihadist activism already is public knowledge 
and confirmed, and persons who have appeared with their real name in openly 
                                                     
 
17 See e.g. Bart Schuurman, “Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, 
and Authorship”, Terrorism and Political Violence (2018); also Deven Parekh, Amarnath 
Amarasingam, Lorne Dawson, Derek Ruths, “Studying Jihadists on Social Media: A Critique of 
Data Collection Methodologies”, Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no 3 (2018), 5–23. 
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available online content produced by them. In this respect, the study follows the 
established practices of Internet research.18   
This report also uses some images to illustrate themes and features associated with 
jihadist online communication. All images contained in the report have already been 
distributed widely, and some have also been published by mainstream media. 
However, we have consciously avoided using the most shocking images (including 
the brutal communication and execution videos of ISIS). We have also avoided long 
quotations where including them in the report would not bring added value to the 
study.  
These principles are in keeping with the objectives of the study. The purpose of the 
study is to provide an overview of the relationship between jihadist online 
communication and Finland, rather than to investigate individuals’ participation in 
these activities or to engage in detailed textual or image analysis.  
 
                                                     
 
18 Annette Markham and Elisabeth Buchanan, “Ethical Decision-Making and Internet Research: 
Recommendations from the AoIR Ethics Working Committee (Version 2.0)”, Association of 
Internet Researchers (AoIR) (2012), https://aoir.org/reports/ethics2.pdf. 
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2 Jihadist online communication as 
an international phenomenon 
In this Chapter, we look at research evidence related to jihadist online communication 
in a broader context. We begin by providing a short review of historical background 
and describe how various jihadist groups have previously used different media forms 
and channels to promote their goals and ideology. We then discuss the online 
communication of three jihadist groups that have attracted attention in Finland -- al-
Qaeda, al-Shabaab and ISIS --and their special features. Finally, we summarise 
research findings regarding the role of online communication in radicalisation of 
persons who become involved in jihadism and provide an overview of the current 
developments in jihadist online communication and potential future trends. 
2.1 Jihadist online communication and the 
changing media environment 
The development of jihadist online communication has followed the opportunities 
offered by a changing media environment. While the digital media environment has 
undergone dramatic changes in the last few decades, so have the communicative 
practices of jihadist movements. The development of jihadist online communication 
can be roughly divided into four phases based on the platforms and types of 
communication which have been prevalent.19 Rather than being mutually exclusive, 
however, these phases have often overlapped. Many platforms created earlier have 
continued to operate, including websites or online forums, while the social media or 
encrypted messaging services have emerged as key forms of communication. 
The earliest phase in jihadist online communication comprised so-called static 
websites, which were the most common form of online communication for jihadist 
movements in the early 2000s. These sites offered movement leaders a means to 
disseminate their message wider than what would have been possible before the 
proliferation of online communication and the social media. The sites were often 
hierarchic, however, and they mainly served as a platform for distributing textual 
content (e.g. ideological pamphlets, religious sermons and reports from war zones) 
and a channel through which the leaders could disseminate their message to those 
outside the inner circle. The early websites did not offer similar extensive 
                                                     
 
19 Meleagrou-Hitchens and Khaderbhai, Research perspectives on Online Radicalisation, 38–49. 
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opportunities for acting anonymously or participating in personal discussions as online 
forums and especially the social media did later on. The websites were also relatively 
easy to supervise, and they were vulnerable to the countermeasures of authorities 
and service providers.20  
The next phase saw the introduction of online forums. They enabled two-way 
interaction between activists in jihadists movements and those interested in the 
movements. Online forums also allowed supporters to talk to likeminded people 
around the world and thus create more extensive global networks around ideological 
aspirations. In particular, the possibility for anonymous communication provided by 
online forums facilitated group activities in online environments. Online forums 
created completely new opportunities for building a feeling of togetherness among the 
‘virtual’ community. Anonymous communication, on the other hand, made it possible 
to safely discuss topics that could otherwise lead to countermeasures, especially in 
cases where the identity of the participants involved in the discussions would be 
revealed to authorities.21 Unlike the early static websites, many of the discussion 
forums had content not only in Arabic but also increasingly in English and other 
Western languages. This allowed the movements to spread their communication and 
activities more widely in the international context and especially among Muslims living 
in Western countries.  
The use of online forums and chatrooms associated with them reached its peak in the 
mid-2000s. For example, many themes and strategies that later took on a key role in 
jihadist online communication, including “open source jihad”, (providing supporters 
with encouragement and guidance in carrying out attacks on their own devices 
without direct links to the movements’ leaders) originate from discussions on such 
forums. While the earlier static websites served rather as the official communication 
channels of movement leaders, these online forums contributed to removing the prior 
elitism and hierarchies of jihadist communication by making it available for ordinary 
supporters and discussions between them.22  
Blogs were another version of these online platforms supporting discussions, which 
were used to disseminate jihadist content especially by individual persons. Since the 
mid-2000s, in particular, blogs and content management systems that facilitated their 
                                                     
 
20 Meleagrou-Hitchens and Khaderbhai, Research perspectives on Online Radicalisation, 39–40. 
21 See also Thomas Hegghammer, “Interpersonal Trust on Jihadi Internet Forums”, in Diego 
Gambetta (ed.) Fight, Flight, Mimic: Identity Signalling in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
22 Aaron Zelin, The State of Global Jihad Online (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation 
2013); see also Akil Awan, "Radicalization on the Internet? The Virtual Propagation of Jihadist 
Media and its Effects", The RUSI Journal 152, no 3 (2007), 76–81; Meleagrou-Hitchens ja 
Khaderbhai, Research perspectives on Online Radicalisation, 40–42. 
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creation, including Wordpress, offered for many supporters an easy and often 
anonymous way of setting up websites and sharing content through them. 
The third phase, or more widespread social media use in the activities of different 
groups, brought along significant changes. Especially the rapid spread of Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube use since the 2010s offered unprecedented opportunities for 
reaching larger audiences anonymously, with smaller resources and faster than what 
was possible a few years earlier. Facebook and the new possibilities for chatting and 
sharing content facilitated the creation of new types of connections between those 
interested in the ideology and supporters who were already active, which in its turn 
enabled the dissemination of information to new audiences and target groups. Twitter 
offered a similar possibility of spreading a message rapidly to a large audience while 
also providing for the interested readers links to other content providers on the web 
where material was still available. YouTube also enabled the effortless dissemination 
of visual content, including videos, as well as an opportunity to discuss the videos in 
the comments.23  
As ISIS supporters travelled to Syria and Iraq, this opened up more new possibilities 
for online interaction. Supporters from around the world were able to share the 
movement’s content more widely across the globe and personally recruit new 
supporters on social media platforms. ISIS media production (videos, memes and 
newsletters), in particular, became known for its diverse ways of producing different 
types of content and targeting it at a variety of countries and audiences.24 Social 
media use reached its peak in 2013–2015.  While social media continues to be used 
quite commonly for this purpose, extensive countermeasures have made it much 
more difficult to share jihadist content, especially in English.  
Today, jihadist communication has been fragmented across a number of channels, 
which in many cases are encrypted and not publicly available. Telegram messaging 
service have become a particularly popular platform for communicating with 
supporters and disseminating content, whereas supporters of jihadist movements 
have also used other similar encrypted messaging services, such as SureSpot, Kik, 
Wire, Signal and WhatsApp. Two new trends have also emerged in this phase, which 
differ from the ways in which jihadist groups have previously operated online. The first 
one is the so-called virtual plotter activity, in which fighters of a movement based in 
Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan have been able to coordinate attacks in Western countries 
                                                     
 
23 See Gabriele Weimann, New Terrorism and New Media, Research Series 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
Commons Lab of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014). 
24 See e.g. Charlie Winter and Dounia Mahlouly, A Tale of Two Caliphates: Comparing the Islamic 
State’s Internal and External Messaging Priorities (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2018), 
https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/A-Tale-of-Two-Caliphates-Mahlouly-and-
Winter.pdf. 
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via Telegram.25 Good examples of these are high-profile terrorist attacks in Europe in 
recent years, including the attack at the Christmas fair in Berlin and live streaming of 
murders of priests in Normandy in 2016. As far as is currently known, ISIS was at 
least partly involved in the virtual plotting of both attacks.26 
Another current trend is the increased use of content sharing platforms (such as 
justpaste.it, sendvid.com, dump.to) and the so-called grey web for disseminating 
content in order to evade countermeasures taken by authorities and companies. 
Rather than spreading content, social media channels including Twitter and Facebook 
(and increasingly also the messaging services Telegram and WhatsApp) now 
primarily serve as portals through which those who are interested can be guided to 
actual jihadist content. This content, in turn, is increasingly dispersed over different 
platforms which are more difficult to access and which usually cannot be found 
without a precise address.27 Jihadist content can thus be hosted on these platforms 
without attracting wider attention. The storage of jihadist content is thus fragmented 
over numerous different platforms, and the content is difficult to delete permanently, 
as it can be rapidly re-posted at a different address.28 
So far, we have discussed jihadist online communication as one homogeneous entity 
in this Chapter. In fact, there are significant differences between the online 
communication of jihadist groups depending on their goals, regional aspirations and 
resources. The history, politics, culture and media environment of their operational 
areas have to some extent influenced the means and objectives of their online 
communication. This makes it difficult to present more precise generalisations 
regarding a large-scale phenomenon which is linked to different movements operating 
in diverse conditions, such as Boko Haram in West Africa, al-Shabaab in Somalia, 
ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines. We should also 
emphasise at this point that, when discussing the development of jihadist online 
                                                     
 
25 See e.g. Rukmini Callimachi, “Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots 
From Afar", The New York Times, 4.2.2017; Amarnath Amarasingam, “An Interview with Rachid 
Kassem, Jihadist Orchestrating attacks in France”, Jihadology, 18.11.2016, 
https://jihadology.net/2016/11/18/guest-post-an-interview-with-rachid-kassim-jihadist-
orchestrating-attacks-in-france/. 
26 See e.g. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman, “Virtual Planners: a Critical 
Terrorist Innovation”, War on the Rocks (2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/isils-virtual-
planners-a-critical-terrorist-innovation/. 
27 See e.g. Shehabat and Mitew, "Black-boxing the Black Flag”, 81–99; also Maura Conway at al., 
"Disrupting Daesh: Measuring the Take-down of Online Extremist Material" (VOX-Pol Network of 
Excellence, 2017), http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-
DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf. 
28 The site justpaste.it, for example, is in practice run by a single person, which makes it more 
difficult to monitor its content on a large scale, unlike on such channels as Twitter or Facebook. 
Carmen Fishwick, “How a Polish student's website became an ISIS propaganda tool”, The 
Guardian 15.8.2014. 
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communication, the focus in this Chapter is on developments and movements which 
have played a key role from the perspective of Western countries.  
In the following section, open communication and publicly available content in the 
network of jihadist movements is illustrated in greater detail by discussing the media 
production of three such movements -- al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab and ISIS. 
In case of Al-Qaeda, perhaps the best-known example is the online magazine Inspire 
produced by the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), through which the 
organisation has sought to spread its ideology in Western countries and respond to 
large-scale military operations against the movement’s leaders in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, has developed its video and radio 
production in Somali to support the movement’s activities in Somalia, and its media 
production in Swahili particularly for Kenya. Content produced by this group has also 
been spread online in other languages outside Somalia, among other things to recruit 
more followers.29  
The media production of ISIS, however, has been the best known and largest in 
scale. While the international attention attracted by ISIS is undoubtedly to a great 
extent based on its military success in the areas of Syria and Iraq, it is equally due to 
the shocking videos produced by the organisation and the new and versatile way of 
using the social media for sharing content and attracting foreign fighters to the area. 
ISIS’s media production and especially its innovative use of digital media are 
considered the prototype of the new forms of communication by armed groups, which 
many other groups have striven to copy.  
2.2 Al-Qaeda 
Al-Qaeda has traditionally played an important role in the development of jihadist 
communication. Whereas ISIS has in recent years been a forerunner in the tactical 
use of violent videos and social media, al-Qaeda was a pioneer of Internet use, 
especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the contemporary practices of 
jihadist online communication were inspired by al-Qaida’s strategic thinkers who 
discussed the role of the new media and the Internet as part of the global jihadist 
movement’s activities. The group's twenty-year strategic plan (2001–2020), “Military 
                                                     
 
29 See e.g.  Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher and James Sheehan, Lights, Camera, 
Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy (London: The International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence ICSR, 2012). See also Christopher Anzalone, “The 
Resilience of al-Shabaab”, CTC Sentinel 9, no 4 (2017), 13–20. 
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Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants”, describes the group’s aspirations to 
increase its global influence. A key element of the strategy was so-called electronic 
jihad, which meant the strategic use of the Internet in raising jihadist awareness, 
recruiting new supporters, training, fundraising and the groups’ activities. For 
example, Yemen-based Anwar al-Awlaki, who was born in America and who inspired 
a number of attacks in Western countries, spoke about the need to create a new 
generation of ‘Internet jihadists’, who could spread the message and content of al-
Qaeda, mobilise supporters and incite them to carrying out terrorist attacks through 
the Internet.30  
Al-Qaeda’s online communication around the mid-2000s was regarded as having 
three objectives. The first objective was creating online libraries and archives used for 
collecting and sharing the movement’s key religious, ideological and military material. 
The second one was creating a platform through which the message of militant 
ideologists, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, could be disseminated widely. The third 
objective was developing jihadist websites and online forums, through which jihadist 
ideological discussions would be possible, activities could be planned and a spirit of 
togetherness could be built.31 
Content sympathetic to Al-Qaeda has been spread online through a number of 
channels.  One of these is As-Sahab Foundation for Islamic Media Publication 
established in 2001, which has operated as the official media production organisation 
of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has also often been linked to the Global Islamic Media Front 
(GIMF), which has produced large amounts of jihadist material and also translated it 
into Western languages, including German, English and French. It has also published 
such online video series as the one titled Voice of the Caliphate used in attempts to 
spread the organisation's message outside mainstream media channels since 2005. 
Both of these were particularly active in 2001–2007, although they have remained 
operative until recent years.32 
The best-known form of al-Qaeda communication directed at the Western public 
probably is the aforementioned Inspire magazine, which first came out in 2010 and 
which was primarily disseminated as an electronic version online. Among other things, 
the magazine contained Osama bin Laden’s speeches and detailed instructions on 
how, for example, the movement’s supporters could participate in carrying out attacks 
                                                     
 
30 See e.g. Carl J. Ciovacco, “The Contours of Al Qaeda's Media Strategy”, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 32, no 10 (2009), 853–875; or Haroro Ingram, “An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: 
Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's Propaganda War”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40,  no 
5 (2016), 357–375. 
31 See e.g. Rudner, “Electronic Jihad”, 10–23. 
32 Steven Stalinsky, The Rise And Fall Of Al-Qaeda’s ‘Al-Sahab’ Media Wing And Its American 
Architect (Memri & Cyber-Jihad, 2017),  http://cjlab.memri.org/analysis-and-special-reports/the-
rise-and-fall-of-al-qaedas-al-sahab-media-wing-and-its-american-architect/. 
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in Western countries without major military resources or coordination by the 
movement’s leaders. Incitement to such activities, known as “open source jihad”, was 
one of the magazine's key themes. Encouraging this type of violent activities was part 
of al-Qaeda’s adjustment to the military defeats it experienced after 2001 (including in 
Iraq and Afghanistan) and the restrictions they created. This operating method has 
later been developed further by other jihadist movements, including ISIS, especially 
following losses of areas held by the organisation in recent years. The screen capture 
below from issue 13 of Inspire in 2014 is a good illustration of how such open source 
jihad operates. 
 
 
Figure 1. Screen capture from al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine which, among other things, contains 
instructions for making bombs and avoiding airport security checks 
2.3 Al-Shabaab 
When al-Shabaab was established in the mid-2000s, its main purpose initially was to 
engage in regional fighting in Somalia. The group's early-stage communication mainly 
consisted of official bulletins and military reports, which were disseminated on 
different websites and news channels. This early-stage material was mainly produced 
in Arabic, and it contained descriptions of military operations and acts of violence. Al-
Shabaab also started producing content in Somali as early as late 2006.  
From the start, al-Shabaab also used websites in its communication, especially when 
targeting Somalis living outside the country. This purpose was served by such 
discussion forums as Ansar al-Mujahideen. The group soon started consciously using 
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media production as part of its aspirations to centralise power to itself. As the war 
continued and became more demanding, videos were also produced in an attempt to 
recruit foreigners and particularly expatriate Somali fighters to support its regional war 
efforts. Content production was coordinated by such groups as Echo of Jihad Center 
for Media (Markaz Sada al-Jihad li-l-l'lam), which has also been linked to al-Qaeda 
and the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), an organisation which supports the 
jihadist cause in more general terms.33  
By 2009, the media production of this group had advanced considerably. It comprised 
audiovisual content and radio broadcasts produced in many different languages. In 
addition to French and English content, the group produced a magazine called Gaidi 
Mtaani, which mainly came out in Swahili but also contained English articles and 
through which the group attempted to recruit fighters, especially among the Muslim 
minority in East Africa. Many of the videos and other content produced by al-Shabaab 
contained themes typical of the global jihadist movement’s communication, including 
reports on military victories, criticism of Western countries’ actions (for example, in 
connection with the controversy related to the Mohammed cartoons published in 
Jyllands-Posten), descriptions of idyllic life in areas ruled by al-Shabaab, and 
recruitment and training of new supporters. The screen capture from the Gaidi Mtaani 
magazine (issue 4) illustrates al-Shabaab’s communication strategy. In the article 
shown in the image, the magazine offers its own version of the attack at Westgate 
shopping mall, which took place in Kenya in 2013.   
Other channels linked to al-Shabaab include or have included Al-Kataib Media 
Foundation which, among other things, produces various videos and bulletins about 
attacks, and Al-Katain News Channel, which broadcasts news about Somalia from the 
group’s perspective, especially for audiences outside Somalia. Radio al-Andalus 
serves as the group’s official radio channel within Somalia, and other media channels 
linked to the movement include al-Furgan Radio and Media. Shahada News Agency 
concentrates on disseminating information about the group's military actions and 
attacks. Such news networks as Somali MeMo and Calamada, which also continue to 
operate online, support the group.  Al-Shabaab additionally has its own Twitter 
accounts which, particularly in 2009–2013, disseminated content sympathetic to the 
group. These accounts also became famous for being used for live tweets during the 
attack at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013.34 
                                                     
 
33 See e.g. Christopher Anzalone, Continuity and Change: the Evolution and Resilience of Al-
Shabab’s Media Insurgency, 2006–2016 (Hate Speech International: Investigating Extremism, 
2016), https://www.hate-speech.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/email_722762_Readers.pdf.  
34 See e.g. David Mair, “#Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during an 
Ongoing Attack”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no 1 (2017), 24–43.  See also Anzalone, 
Continuity and Change, 11. 
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Figure 2. A screen capture from al-Shabaab’s Gaidi Mtaani online magazine reporting on the attack at 
Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi 
Al-Shabaab’s media production started to wind down after 2010, however, at which 
time the group also experienced large-scale military setbacks. Since it joined al-
Qaeda, multilingualism and communication targeted at international audiences have 
been increasingly stressed in al-Shabaab’s communication strategy. Its main purpose 
appears to be to recruit fighters and support from abroad as the movement has lost 
control of areas in Somalia and its activities have again taken on the characteristics of 
guerrilla warfare. Regardless of its losses, however, al-Shabaab remains active. 
Among other things, the group carried out another attack in Nairobi in January 2019 
and continues to produce online content in order to boost its status. 
2.4 ISIS 
In recent years, ISIS has become known for its diverse media strategy drawing on 
new types of digital media techniques, through which the group has tailored its 
message to the needs of different audiences and maximised the recognisability of its 
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“brand”’.35 The production and use of shockingly violent videos has been part of ISIS’s 
communication strategy for some time.  ISIS’s predecessor, Muntada al-Ansar, 
published a video showing the execution of Nick Berg, an American businessman, 
already in 2004 as revenge for the Americans’ actions in Iraq.36 Since 2012, ISIS’s 
media production has comprised films, videos, social media activity, newsletters and a 
monthly magazine that has been available both online and through smartphone apps. 
Unlike earlier jihadist communication, which often consisted of long speeches and 
religious sermons, ISIS videos have been more visually ambitious, of higher quality, 
and clearly intended to appeal to younger audiences. Many cinematographic and 
graphic techniques, images and filming styles adopted from games, and dramatic 
means of expression aiming to make the message easy to adopt and appealing to 
different target audiences are used in the group's media production. The screen 
captures below and on the following page from a film titled ‘Flames of War’, which 
appeared in English in 2014, are a good illustration of this ‘Hollywood-style’ visual 
look often intended for Western and young audiences.37 
 
 
Figure 3.  A screen capture from an ISIS video reflecting the high-quality visual look of the group’s videos 
  
                                                     
 
35 See e.g. Haroro Ingram, “Three Traits of the Islamic State's Information Warfare”, The RUSI 
Journal 159, no 6 (2014), 4–11; Haroro Ingram, “The strategic logic of Islamic State information 
operations”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no 6 (2015), 729–752. 
36 See e.g. "Zarqawi' beheaded US man in Iraq", BBC News 3 May 2004. 
37 See e.g. Meira Svirsky, “ISIS Releases ‘Flames of War’ Feature Film to Intimidate West”, Clarion 
Project 21.9.2014. https://clarionproject.org/isis-releases-flames-war-feature-film-intimidate-
west/. 
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Figure 4.  A screen capture from an ISIS video in which the group’s military might is highlighted visually 
with special effects and using several different camera angles 
The longest-standing ISIS media organisation is Furqan Foundation for Media 
Production, which continues to operate and produce many types of material (CDs, 
DVDs, posters, official statements). This media machine has been expanded several 
times, for example through Al-I'tisam Media Foundation and Ajnad Foundation for 
Media Production. The latter mainly focus on audio communication and nasheed 
songs. In addition, Al Hayat Media Center tends to target its communication at 
Western audiences, and it produces content especially in English, German, Russian, 
and French. It has also published the magazine Dabiq, which has attracted a great 
deal of attention in Western countries, and its successor Rumiyah. These magazines 
mainly feature ISIS’s content in which textual material predominates (e.g. stories of 
foreign fighters and interpretations of religious texts). ISIS also publishes the 
newspaper Al-Naba in Arabic.  The news agency Amaq is ISIS’s official news 
channel, which disseminates the organisation's news through different channels, 
including Telegram and mobile apps. The group also has an official radio channel, Al-
Bayan, which broadcasts news of the group’s activities in a number of languages. 
Semi-official or unofficial media organisations, including Al-Batār Media Foundation, 
have also been linked to ISIS.  While these organisations that support jihadismin a 
broader sense have produced plenty of pro-ISIS material, they have not been 
considered a part of ISIS’s official communication machine. 
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ISIS’s communication channels differ from each other regarding the type of content 
and target audiences. The Arabic communication of Al-Naba, for example, consists 
mainly of news stressing the practical aspects of building an Islamic state and daily 
war news. Dabiq and Rumiyah, on the other hand, are mainly intended for the 
international audience, and they contain articles emphasising the global dimension of 
the jihadist fight and in-depth discussions on ideological topics.38 The diagram below 
describes the highly multidimensional media production linked to ISIS.39 
 
 
Figure 5.  A diagram illustrating the structure of ISIS’s media production40 
Several different themes and narratives can be perceived in the content of ISIS's 
media production. The suffering of Sunni Muslims and especially children caused by 
Western countries’ war efforts in the Middle East is a common theme. These stories 
strive to appeal to Muslims globally. Another frequent theme is highlighting the 
group’s achievements and military power. This content often has pictures of dead 
soldiers, military patrols, training camps and battles. Their purpose is to raise a 
fighting spirit among sympathisers and attract new adventurous supporters to join the 
fight. It can also be thought to aim for a psychological effect by instilling fear in 
opponents.  
                                                     
 
38 Winter and Mahlouly, A Tale of Two Caliphates.  
39 Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’. 
40 Diagram from Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’, 16. 
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An aspect of ISIS’s media production that has attracted a great deal of attention in 
Western countries is so-called brutal communication, through which the group has 
attempted to instil fear in its opponents, convince its supporters of its capabilities, and 
provoke its local enemies and the international media to pay attention to its activities. 
The best-known examples of these probably are the execution videos, in which a man 
nicknamed Jihadi John speaks in English directly to Western audiences, with the 
obvious intention of provoking media attention in the West and getting Western 
countries to react to the group’s cruelty and violence. The use of English language 
and European fighters on the videos is further intended to emphasise the idea of ISIS 
as a dangerous enemy also within Europe, as its activities are not limited merely to 
the regional conflict in Iraq and Syria. This brutal communication often stresses the 
cruelty of ISIS and uses dramatic visual techniques, creating the image of a strong 
military might that does not hesitate to use any means against the infidels. The screen 
capture from an ISIS execution video below is an example of how ISIS creates an 
image of itself as a mighty opponent relentless towards its enemies.  
 
 
Figure 6.  A screen capture from an ISIS execution video as an example of the group's brutal 
communication41 
As a counterbalance for communication focusing on violence and the suffering of 
Sunni Muslims, content depicting normal life in areas ruled by ISIS has also been 
produced.  Harmonious life in a society organised according to the principles of Islam 
is specifically presented as a contrast to violence. The content repeatedly shows 
                                                     
 
41 A screen capture from Dashiell Bennett and Polly Mosendz, "New ISIS Video Reportedly Shows 
the Execution of British Hostage", The Atlantic 13 September 2014. 
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images of happy children, well-functioning infrastructure and agriculture. It also often 
contains encouraging descriptions of fighters who have moved to Syria and Iraq from 
around the world to serve ISIS.42 The screen capture below is from a video titled 
‘Islamic State Caliphate Eid Greetings from the Land of Khilafah’, which was 
published by ISIS in August 2014 and which shows images of daily life under ISIS in 
Syria. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  A screen capture from an ISIS video titled ‘Islamic State Caliphate Eid Greetings from the Land of 
Khilafah’ depicting daily life under ISIS 
ISIS has also been active on the social media, where it has shared plenty of content 
in different forms and recruited supporters. These activities were particularly prolific in 
2013–2015, a period in which researchers who charted the group's activities on 
Twitter found tens of thousands of pro-ISIS accounts around the globe.43 Not all of 
them were directly linked to ISIS. Research indicates that in the pro-ISIS online milieu, 
many types of actors playing different roles can be identified, including militants and 
active producers and distributors of content (disseminators), supporters (jihobbyists) 
and passive consumers supporting the ideology (fan boys).44 In practice, this has 
meant that content supporting ISIS was produced and shared not only by the 
organisation’s own media activists and production machine but also a large unofficial 
                                                     
 
42 Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’. 
43 John M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the 
Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter (Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings,The 
Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World,  2015). 
44 See e.g. Jarrett Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2008); 
Joseph Carter, Shiraz Maher and Peter R. Neumann, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and 
Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks (London: International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation - ICSR, 2014). 
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network of supporters that emerged around it, which produced a great number of ‘fan 
videos’, memes and other content typical of social media inspired by ISIS but to a 
great extent outside its control. 
Extensive countermeasures against ISIS and the social media profiles supporting it 
have since greatly disrupted pro-ISIS online communication.45 A situation not unlike 
the Whack-a-Mole arcade game has emerged between those setting up Twitter 
accounts and those closing down extremist accounts: accounts supporting ISIS are 
taken down as soon as they appear on the social media.46 In 2015–2016, for example, 
Twitter closed down 125,000 accounts supporting ISIS. In recent years, only sporadic 
activities have been observed, especially in Arabic or key Western languages.47  In 
2018, Twitter declared itself the winner of this Whack-a-Mole game, as its innovations 
allowed 94% of accounts supporting terrorism to be closed down automatically, and 
74% of these accounts had already been taken down before they had time to 
disseminate a single message.48 
While Twitter undeniably was a key communication channel for ISIS earlier, this does 
not necessarily hold true any longer. Whereas Twitter continues to play a role as part 
of the more extensive media environment linked to ISIS, the organisation’s activities 
have found refuge in messaging services, such as Telegram, in which hundreds of 
different channels and groups have existed since 2016. Their content is often in 
Arabic, but material has also been translated into many Western languages. ISIS’s 
official media production also continues to be published on Telegram.   
2.5 Jihadist online content and violent 
radicalisation 
Communication and interaction online and on the social media have many purposes 
for jihadist movements, and the opportunities offered by a changing media 
                                                     
 
45 See e.g. John M. Berger, Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: a Comparative Analysis of White Nationalists 
and ISIS Online Social Media Networks (Washington, D.C.: GW Programme on Extremism, 2016), 
https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/Nazis%20v.%20ISIS%20Final_0.pdf. 
46 See e.g. Joseph Karam, Twitter, ISIS and Social Media Whack-a-Mole (Foreign Policy 
Association, 2016), https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/02/09/twitter-isis-social-media-whack-
mole/; 
also Conway et al., Disrupting Daesh.  
47 In 2016, Twitter announced it had taken down 125,000 accounts sympathetic to ISIS during the 
year.  See e.g. Danny Yadron, “Twitter deletes 125,000 ISIS accounts and expands anti-terror 
teams”, The Guardian 5.2. 2016.  
48 See Natasha Lomas, “Twitter claims more progress on squeezing terrorist content”, Techcrunch 
5.4.2018, https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/05/twitter-transparency-report-12. 
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environment have influenced the movement's development in many ways. Many of 
these goals and influences have already been touched upon above. To conclude this 
Chapter, however, it is apt to discuss one of them in a broader context: the assumed 
role of social media communication in radicalisation.  
The potential for so-called online radicalisation has been discussed many times in 
recent years, also in Finland: the possibility that a person adopts a jihadist mentality 
through the Internet and, consequently, starts independently planning violent attacks. 
While this threat of a person sitting at a computer alone, without attracting anyone’s 
attention, and being radicalised enough to carry out violent attacks is a cause for 
concern from security authorities’ perspective, research findings indicate that such 
cases are rare.  
Online communication has undeniably changed jihadist activity in many ways. A link 
between the number of violent attacks and the widespread use of the Internet is 
difficult to prove, however. A study that analysed terrorist activities in 1990–2011 
showed that increased Internet use has not resulted in growing terrorist activity. 
Research has shown that few of those who have carried out violent attacks alone can 
be regarded as having been radicalised exclusively based on online content and 
discussions. Research findings also indicate that the likelihood of attacks carried out 
by those who only communicate online with persons with a similar ideological 
predisposition is smaller than for those who additionally have had social contacts with 
such persons in real life.49  
A great deal of research has been conducted in violent radicalisation in recent years. 
In this context, the role of jihadist online communication in the process of 
radicalisation has also been analysed. There are strong indications that Internet and 
social media use should always be seen in relation to activities offline. The social 
media complements rather than replaces social relationships in the real world.50 On 
the other hand, Internet use may reinforce ideas already held by a person and 
complement existing social networks.51 According to a theory, online communication 
is like a virtual glue binding together ideologically likeminded jihadist actors, also 
                                                     
 
49 See e.g. Paul Gill, John Horgan and Paige Deckert, “Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations 
and Antecedent Behaviour of Lone-Actor Terrorists”, Journal of Forensic Sciences 59, no 2 (2014), 
425–435. 
50 See Paul Gill, Maura Conway, Emily Corner and Amy Thornton, What are the Roles of the 
Internet in Terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists (VOX-Pol Network 
of Excellence, 2015). 
51 See e.g. Ines von Behr, Charlie Edwards, Luke Gribbon and Anais Reding, Radicalisation in the 
Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism (Brussels: Rand 
Europe, 2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR453.html. 
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those who do not have strong ties or links in the non-virtual world.52 Internet and 
social media platforms have thus served as a ‘jihadisphere’, which has enabled 
jihadist communication inciting violence to spread across the globe faster and more 
extensively than what was possible before the Internet or the social media existed.  
Supported by these observations, academic research has increasingly rejected the 
‘internet-centric’ approach in favour of a more all-round analysis of the social networks 
and relationships online.  The new approach sees Internet and social media use as 
part of complex interaction between online and real-world offline activities.  
Radicalisation is the sum total of many factors, and social networks play a key role in 
it. While the Internet may lead people more easily and faster than before to 
movements and actors that incite violence, they do not replace personal contacts. In 
most cases, transition towards actual acts of violence or acceptance of such acts can 
happen more easily only when personal contacts with activists in violent movements 
have been established.  
The Internet and social media thus serve, above all, as channels for establishing 
contacts that are significant in violent radicalisation and in forming personal 
relationships that play a key role in it. The initial contact between individuals 
interested in such ideas and active supporters may take place on social media 
channels, including Twitter or Facebook, or currently more often on Telegram or even 
online gaming platforms and the chatrooms associated with them.53 In this initial 
phase, however, the participants usually merely share ideological and religious 
material. Only when the interested individuals move on to more restricted discussion 
channels and begin to communicate with active members of violent movements in 
person are they offered material directly inciting violence and urged to participate in 
the groups’ violent activities. At the same time, interpersonal relationships may be 
established, which often play a key role in participation in violent acts.54   
                                                     
 
52 See e.g. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-
First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Marc Sageman, “The Next 
Generation of Terror”, Foreign Policy 8 October 2009, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/08/the-
next-generation-of-terror/. 
53 Seamus Hughes, Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Bennet Clifford, "A New American Leader 
Rises in ISIS", The Atlantic 13 January 2018.  
54 John M. Berger, “Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy”, CTC 
Sentinel 8, no 10 (2015), 19–23. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 
 
41 
 
 
2.6 Future trends in jihadist online 
communication 
What, then, does the future of jihadist online communication look like from a 
researcher’s perspective? Attempts to disseminate jihadist content online will certainly 
also be made in the future, as jihadist activity is not expected to subside either in 
Western countries or globally over the next few years. The forms of online 
communication and the platforms used for it are likely to develop in pace with the 
potential offered by advancement in communication technology and the Internet also 
in the future. Various users find their way to evolving technologies and platforms and 
changing modes of using them without delay, and jihadist activity is no exception. In 
the last twenty years, jihadist online communication has moved from websites and 
forums to the social media and encrypted messaging services.  
Similarly, the future trends of jihadist online communication will continue to reflect the 
more large-scale changes in the digital media environment. Perhaps the most 
important trend is related to the more widespread use of encrypted channels not only 
in society in general but also for disseminating jihadist content in particular and in the 
activities emerging around it. As a result of countermeasures taken by the authorities 
and technology companies, it has been obvious for some time now that jihadist 
communication cannot operate on public sites or on conventional social media as it 
did before. These activities will become even more difficult as technologies for the 
identification and extensive deletion of content based on new systems helped by 
artificial intelligence advance.55  This means that jihadist content is likely to move 
increasingly to the so-called deep web or darknet, where it can still be hosted in large 
quantities and, if necessary, shared with those who show an interest. 
In addition to the public Internet, a great volume of content and many websites exist 
which are either password protected or cannot be accessed by search engines. 
Studies show that this ‘deep web’ is much larger than the publicly available Internet, 
and it provides many services that are not in the search engines’ registers, including 
several content sharing platforms.  In addition, there is the ‘darknet’, which can only 
be accessed by means of software that automatically removes all identifying data of 
the user (including the computer's IP address).  As this section of the web is very 
difficult to access and monitor, it is also used for unlawful commerce and 
dissemination of illegal content (e.g. child pornography). Researchers’ initial findings 
                                                     
 
55 Facebook reports that it already removes approx. 99% of content related to terrorism, mainly by 
using algorithms. “Facebook’s AI wipes terrorism-related posts”, BBC 29 November 2017. 
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indicate that these encrypted sites are increasingly used to also spread jihadist 
content or to recruit supporters.56 
This does not mean that jihadist actors would be expected to abandon the use of the 
public Internet. As we have already seen, the first contact between supporters and 
members of violent movements is still often established on the public Internet. It is 
highly probable that the publicly accessible communication channels will continue to 
serve as a meeting point of this type, from where interested persons are rapidly 
directed to the darknet and/or encrypted channels, however, on which more active 
communication and recruitment can take place. In addition, the darknet may serve as 
a new clearing house for jihadist content, always finding a new alternative place to be 
accessed from as content is taken down.  
Researchers have recently speculated how such terrorist groups as ISIS will adapt to 
the extensive countermeasures of the authorities and technology companies.  A 
transition to decentralised online platforms is predicted to be one of the potential 
trends. Researchers have warned that especially communication platforms based on 
new blockchain technology, such as Riot, will offer new ways of operating outside 
official monitoring, also for jihadist groups. It is still too early to say how common the 
use of such innovations will be in the future.57   
                                                     
 
56 Nikita Malik,  Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption, the Darknet, and 
Cryptocurrencies (London: Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism at the Henry 
Jackson Society, 2018), http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-
the-Dark.pdf. 
57 See e.g. Lorand Bodo, Decentralised Terrorism: the Next Big Step for the so-called Islamic State 
(VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2018), https://www.voxpol.eu/decentralised-terrorism-the-next-
big-step-for-the-so-called-islamic-state-is/. 
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3 Jihadist online communication and 
Finland 
Historically, Finland has had a marginal role in the multidimensional jihadist online 
milieu described above. For example, a comprehensive study of ISIS’s global 
Facebook networks published in 2018 only contained a few sporadic references to 
Finland.58 International research in jihadist (online) communication in general makes 
few references to Finland.   
This Chapter focuses on online content that is or was available between 2014 and 
2018. Producing a corresponding analysis concerning the period before the conflict in 
Syria and Iraq would not have been very meaningful. References to Finland, in 
particular, in key jihadist publications and speeches have been few and far between. 
The first such reference known to this group of researchers dates back to 2008: 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leading al-Qaeda figure, announced that al-Qaeda will not 
“attack Brazilian tourists in Finland or the Vietnamese in Venezuela.”59 Al-Zawahiri 
used this example to stress that rather than being random, the group’s attacks were 
part of its carefully considered strategy for the group’s communication with its 
enemies.  In other words, Finland was cited as an example of a country where it 
would not make strategic sense for al-Qaeda to carry out attacks.  
Another reference that also attracted media attention in Finland at the time dates back 
to 2011; on a website supporting jihadism, a person called Abu Suleiman al-Nasser 
praised a recent attempt for an attack in Länsi-Pasila and a firebomb attack at a petrol 
station in Tapaninvainio (both in Helsinki). He also incited attacks against Finnish 
troops in Afghanistan. While this threat attracted attention in Finland, it was ultimately 
not particularly exceptional or significant. Similar threats against the troops of other 
Western countries have been rather commonplace. Soon afterwards, another (non-
jihadist) actor claimed responsibility for the attacks in Pasila and Tapaninvainio, with a 
lot more credibility.60  
                                                     
 
58 Gregory Waters and Robert Postings, Spiders of the Caliphate: Mapping the Islamic State's 
Global Support Network on Facebook (Counter-terrorism Project, 2018), 
https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Spiders%20of%20the%20Caliphate%20%2
8May%202018%29.pdf. 
59 Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda mastermind questions terrorism”, The 
New Yorker 2 June 2008. 
60 See e.g. Sunnuntaistrategisti, ”Abu Sulaiman al-Nasser, Suomen kauhu?” The Ulkopolitist 2 
June 2011; Leena Malkki and Daniel Sallamaa, “To Call or Not to Call it Terrorism: Public Debate 
on Ideologically-Motivated Acts of Violence in Finland, 1991–2015”, Terrorism and Political 
Violence 30, no 5 (2018). 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 
 
44 
 
 
Some pieces written in Finnish whose content was close to the jihadist worldview are 
additionally known from the period preceding the conflict in Syria. The most 
noteworthy of these was an article translated into Finnish and uploaded to the web in 
2009 titled “The duty of sisters in Jihad”. It contained a detailed description of 
women's role in supporting violent jihadism. The article provided numerous 
instructions on how to bring up your children to be jihadists and contained pictures of 
children carrying bombs intended for suicide strikes. In mid-2000s, there was also a 
debate on the appropriate response to the move of Kavkaz Center (which was 
sympathetic to Chechen rebels), to a new server located in Finland.61  
The discussion on online communication with links to Finland has been divided into 
two sections in this Chapter. The first section describes how and in which contexts 
Finland has been referred to in jihadist groups’ key online content, including online 
magazines and videos. The second section examines the types of content that 
persons who live or lived in Finland disseminated or produced. Finally we return 
shortly to the question of Telegram content. 
3.1 Finland in jihadist movements’ key online 
content 
According to the current knowledge, Finland has mostly been conspicuous by its 
absence from jihadist material before the conflict in Syria, whereas some references 
to Finland can be found in the content produced by ISIS. These references link 
Finland to jihadist discussions more closely than before. At the same time, however, it 
should be stressed that such references remain few and far between.  
3.1.1 References to Finland in jihadist online 
magazines 
Finland or persons linked to Finland appeared in jihadist online magazines a few 
times in 2014–2018. The following section discusses in detail the references to 
Finland in ISIS’s English online magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah and the Arabic 
newspaper Al-Naba. 
Dabiq. Dabiq was an ISIS online magazine intended for the international audience, 15 
issues of which were published in 2014–2016.  While the magazine was widely 
                                                     
 
61 This issue is mentioned in the annual report of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service for 2004, 
for example. Great many media features on this topic also came out over a period of several years.  
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available on the so-called darknet/grey web, it was also shared on the social media.  It 
was published in many different languages, but its English version was perhaps the 
one to attract the greatest international attention. The articles of the magazine 
discussed especially topics intended for Muslims living in Western countries and 
included many stories on religious themes and descriptions of life under ISIS. In the 
same vein as in earlier jihadist online magazines (including al-Qaeda's Inspire), Dabiq 
also discussed the importance of religious warfare and violent attacks in the fight 
against the Western countries. 62  
Two articles with references to Finland were published in Dabiq. The first one 
appeared in issue 11, which came out in September 2015. This issue focused on 
describing the righteousness of ISIS's war and its relationship with historical battles 
against the Western countries. Finland is mentioned in an article titled “From the 
Battle of Al-Alzhab to the War of the Coalitions”, which draws a parallel between 
historical battles and the fight against the modern Western ‘crusader coalition’ in Iraq 
and Syria.  According to this article, the countries participating in this war include 
Albania, the Arab League, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, the 
European Union, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Oman, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, 
Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Finland. In terms of its contents, the article is a typical piece on the theme “Islam at 
war”. This theme is highly visible in many other articles in Dabiq and also more 
extensively in ISIS material.63 The article is rare in the sense that it lists Finland 
among the enemy countries. On the other hand, the list is clearly longer than what 
would usually be expected and also contains other small countries, such as Iceland, 
Luxembourg and Latvia. 
Another reference to Finland can be found in issue 15 of Dabiq titled “Break the 
Cross”, which came out in July 2016 and  which focuses on religious themes. In an 
article related to this theme titled “How I came to Islam”, a Finnish woman using the 
pseudonym Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyyah explains why she moved away from Finland 
                                                     
 
62 See e.g. Haroro Ingram, "An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine", Australian Journal of 
Political Science 51, no 3 (2016), 458–477; see also Robert J. Bunker and Pamela L. Bunker, 
"Radical Islamist English-Language Online Magazines: Research Guide, Strategic Insights" 
(Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2018), 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1381.pdf. 
63 Julian Droogan and Shane Pettie, “Mapping the thematic landscape of Dabiq magazine”, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no 6 (2017), 591–620. 
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and how she found “true” religion with ISIS. In her article, she describes Finland as a 
“corrupt Christian country”, where people do not follow the true religion. The article 
also relates how the woman finally decided to move to an Islamic country, in her case 
Syria. Additionally, she describes how the final impetus for this was when “infidel 
authorities” arrested her husband for terrorism and kept him in prison. As far as we 
know, she is the wife of the accused in Finland’s first court case related to terrorism. 
The whole family moved away from Finland before the case was heard by the court of 
appeal.64  The extent to which this article was written by the woman herself is not 
known. Based on the consistent style and similarities between the articles published 
in Dabiq, we may presume that they have been edited with a heavy hand. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Screen captures from issue 15 of Dabiq containing a reference to Finland 
The themes of this article, too, are highly typical of ISIS’s English communication. In 
particular, it was related to the theme of moving to the caliphate, which came up in 
Dabiq frequently. These articles usually highlight personal reasons and motivation for 
moving to the ISIS-ruled territory.65 Women, specifically, have had a high profile in 
                                                     
 
64 Sara Rigatelli, “Somalimiehen hätkähdyttävä tarina: Vapautui Suomessa terrorismituomiosta, oli 
jo ISISissä”, Yle 4 March 2017. 
65  Droogan and Pettie, “Mapping the thematic landscape of Dabiq magazine”, 591–620. 
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these ‘softer’ recruitment stories which, rather than military themes or justifications for 
violence, relate personal stories and positive experiences among ISIS.66 
Rumiyah. Similarly to Dabiq, Rumiyah was an online magazine intended for 
international distribution. The first issue came out in September 2016 after Dabiq was 
discontinued. According to researchers’ interpretation, the magazine's name was 
changed from Dabiq to Rumiyah when ISIS lost control of the town called Dabiq 
located in Iraq. This town had been a key symbol in ISIS’s communication.  According 
to a prediction in the Quran, a battle between Muslims and infidels at the end of times 
would take place in Dabiq, resulting in victory for the Muslims. Renaming the 
publication Rumiyah reflected ISIS’s international strategy, which was modified in the 
aftermath of losses of territory. The name Rumiyah refers to Rome and, more 
specifically, a Quran prediction according to which the Muslims will conquer Rome.67 
Rumiyah came out 13 times in 2016–2017.  Its contents were to a great extent similar 
to those in Dabiq. In addition to religious themes, Rumiyah placed more emphasis on 
the importance of martyrdom and terrorist attacks for Muslims living in Western 
countries.  Similarly to al-Qaeda’s Inspire a few years earlier, Rumiyah attracted a 
great deal of attention in mainstream media as it published a series of instructions on 
how individuals can participate in ISIS’s fight by carrying out independent attacks.  
Among other things, the magazine provided detailed instruction on how individuals 
can carry out attacks requiring little training or resources, for example by using knives 
or trucks as weapons.68  
Finland is mentioned in one article in Rumiyah. This reference is found in the seventh 
issue of the magazine published in March 2017 under the title “Establishing the 
Islamic State: Between the Prophetic Methodology and the Path of the Deviants”.  
This issue had a particular focus on the role of religion in defending ISIS. In an article 
titled ”What they never told me”, another young woman born in Finland related her 
personal experiences of religion and its role under ISIS using the pseudonym Umm 
Musa al-Finlandiyyah. According to information published in newspapers, she is 
                                                     
 
66 See The Women in Daesh: Deconstructing Complex Gender Dynamics in Daesh Recruitment 
Propaganda (The Carter Centre, 2017), https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/ 
conflict_resolution/countering-isis/women-in-daesh.pdf. Also Julia Musial, “My Muslim sister, in-
deed you are a mujahidah” - Narratives in the propaganda of the Islamic State to address and 
radicalize Western Women. An Exemplary analysis of the online magazine Dabiq”, Journal for 
deradicalization no 9 (2016), 39–100. 
67 See e.g. Winter and Mahlouly, "A Tale of Two Caliphates”, 13–14.  
68 See e.g. Peter Wignell, Sabine Tan, Kay L. O’Halloran & Rebecca Lange, “A Mixed Methods 
Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and 
Rumiyah." Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no 2 (2017), 2–20. 
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married to a man with Bangladeshi background who had studied in Finland and used 
the fighter name of Abu Musa, who also had left Finland for this area.69 
Unlike the earlier feature in Dabiq, this article was not directly dealing with Finland 
and only contained a few references to Finland (in addition to the writer’s background 
and pseudonym). The first reference is associated with the writer’s feeling that 
orthodox religion was prohibited in Finland, which is why it is important for orthodox 
Muslims to join the ranks of ISIS. According to the article, for example many key 
terms for infidel Muslims used by jihadism, including kufr (infidel) and riddah (a 
Muslim who abandons the true religion) are taboos among Muslims in Finland and 
cannot be uttered aloud. The article also contains a picture of the Pro Finlandia 
1939⎯1944 memorial for Finnish Muslims who lost their lives in the war located in the 
Islamic graveyard in Helsinki. These soldiers are described in the piece as infidel 
Muslims (murtaddin) who have turned away from true Islam. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Screen captures from issue 7 of Rumiyah containing a reference to Finland 
  
                                                     
 
69 Sara Rigatelli, “Suomi taas esillä ISISin propagandassa - Yhtenä syynä suomalaistaustaiset 
ISIS-johtajat”, Yle 10 March 2017. 
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Figure 10.  A screen capture from an issue of ISIS's Rumiyah magazine showing a picture of the  
Pro Finlandia memorial in Helsinki 
While references to Finland in ISIS’s English magazines have not been particularly 
numerous nor necessarily had a very strong focus on Finland, bringing up Finland and 
persons who came from Finland symbolises the country's new role in the international 
jihadist milieu. These references for the first time made Finland openly a part of 
international jihadist communication. If Finland’s role in such international jihadist 
content previously was neutral or invisible, the country had now been added to the list 
of ISIS’s Western enemies, against which the organisation fights. A significant cause 
of this change undoubtedly was the fact that dozens of people travelled from Finland 
to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq, considerably exceeding the numbers going to 
other similar zones before. The references to Finland can thus be seen as a reflection 
of Finland’s better recognisability in jihadist networks, to which the Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service has also drawn attention.70   
Al-Naba. If Dabiq and Rumiyah represent communication intended for the 
international audience, the Arabic newspaper Al-Naba is the internal communication 
channel of ISIS. Al-Naba is the official newspaper of ISIS, which it distributed as a 
printed version to fighters living in Iraq and Syria and to other residents of the 
‘caliphate’. It is also widely published online as part of ISIS’s more extensive 
international communication. The paper has come out weekly since 2015, and it 
contains news articles of different lengths and reviews of ISIS’s military and political 
                                                     
 
70 Eero Mäntymaa, "Supo: Terrori-iskun uhka Suomessa kohonnut – Suomi mainitaan aiempaa 
useammin ISISin propagandassa”,  Yle 14 June 2017. 
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activities. Unlike the online magazines published in Western languages, Al-Naba 
gives a more accurate idea of ISIS’s operative challenges, strategy and activities as 
well as life in territories ruled by ISIS.71   
For the purposes of this study, we went through all issues of Al-Naba, looking for 
references to Finland. The results of the search indicate that Finland is only referred 
to once in issue 118. This news item was about the knife attack in Turku in August 
2017. It reported that the perpetrator of the attack, Abderrahman Bouanane, 
considered himself an ISIS fighter and justified his act by the United States’ air strikes 
in Syria. The short news article in Arabic described the reason for the attack and 
Finland as follows: "The police in Finland  – a country located in the northern part of 
the globe – believe that the attack is connected to terrorism.  The police have also 
added that Bouanane arrived in Finland in 2016 and lived at a reception centre in 
Turku, where his application was rejected."  The article did not in any way comment 
on the potential relationship between the attack and ISIS or the fact that the 
perpetrator himself said he had acted in the name of ISIS.  
The significance of Al-Naba in ISIS’s communication outside the territories ruled by it 
is not very well known. The newspaper shows little interest in themes related to 
supporters living outside Syria and Iraq. Consequently, it is not particularly surprising 
that Finland is hardly mentioned. 
3.1.2 References to Finland in jihadist videos 
Persons who have left Finland to travel to the conflict zone have appeared on some 
jihadist videos.  In many cases it appears, however, that even if the person came from 
Finland, the fact that they were Finnish was not an essential part of the message or 
theme of the video. An example of this is a video on which fighters with a Somali 
background try to persuade al-Shabaab to join the ranks of ISIS. One of the fighters 
on the video is a person with a Somali background who left Finland for Syria. 
However, the video makes no reference to the fighter being Finnish, nor does it 
discuss Finland.72 There are several similar examples of Finnish persons appearing 
on jihadist videos (probably more besides the ones identified and discovered within 
the limits of this study). Rather than necessarily being central, Finland's role on these 
videos may mainly be a device for highlighting that people have travelled to Syria and 
Iraq from all around the world, from countries as far away as Finland.  
                                                     
 
71 Winter and Mahlouly, A Tale of Two Caliphates. 
72 Robyn Kriel and Lillian Leposo, “In video, Somali ISIS members court Al-Shabaab”, CNN 22 
May 2015.  
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While ISIS is perhaps best known for its violent and shocking videos showing 
executions and fighting, many of its videos have also depicted normal life under its 
rule.  In videos focusing on the themes of ‘utopia’ or ‘belonging’, Muslims who have 
moved from Western countries to Syria often relate their personal reasons for moving 
to the caliphate. They describe idyllic life under ISIS and extoll the togetherness of 
fighters under the caliphate’s rule.73 
A good example of these themes is a video titled ‘Islamic State Caliphate Eid 
Greetings from the Land of Khilafah’, on which an ISIS fighter who came from Finland 
persuades Western Muslims to come and join ISIS's fight. This video is rare in the 
sense that a man with a Somali background using the fighter name Abu Shu’ayb as-
Somali talks directly to the audience in Finnish on it. The media has identified the 
person on the video as a young man from Helsinki region who later lost his life in 
Syria.74 This video, which had a high number of views, sparked plenty of public 
discussion in Finland as it gave for the first time a face to foreign fighters who moved 
from Finland to Syria and Iraq and highlighted the threat of radicalisation among 
young Finns in public discussion. 
 
 
Figure 11. An ISIS fighter who left Finland for Syria talks to his audience in Finnish on a YouTube video 
titled ‘Islamic State  
Caliphate Eid Greetings from the Land of Khilafah’  
                                                     
 
73 Charlie Winter refers to these themes as ‘Utopia’ and ‘belonging’. Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’. 
74 “Miten kaksi miestä lähtee Leppävaarasta pyhään sotaan?”, Helsingin Sanomat 7 August 2014. 
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Figure 12. An ISIS fighter who left Finland for Syria talks to his audience in Finnish on a YouTube video 
titled ‘Islamic State  
Caliphate Eid Greetings from the Land of Khilafah’  
The video has English subtitles, and its target audience appears to be Muslims in 
Western countries in general. The man mentions on the video that he comes from 
Finland, and he invites all Western Muslims to join the ‘land of the caliphate’. The 
video also refers to Finland by name in a few contexts, for example when the man 
says he believes that sharia will be imposed in all Western countries, including 
Finland, and how all Muslims in America and Europe, including Finland, should submit 
to the rule of the caliphate. Using Finnish on the video should thus be seen as ISIS’s 
broader strategy of putting persons from a number of different countries in front of the 
camera. While the message naturally has an appeal in the speaker's country of origin, 
it can be generalised to attract all Western Muslims through the personal stories of 
those coming from different countries. 
A person from Finland also appears on another video discussing people’s reasons for 
moving to Syria and Iraq. In this Arabic recording, which was probably made 
somewhere in Syria in 2013, a person using the name of Abu Mansour who says he is 
from Finland stands in the street in front of an audience. He answers a question put to 
him by the host of the event and explains to the audience shortly that he has come to 
the area to help establish the caliphate.75 The participants on the video also joke 
                                                     
 
75 Jukka Huusko, ”Suomalaiseksi väitetty mies esiintyy äärijärjestö ISISin tv-ohjelmassa", 
Helsingin Sanomat 14 June 2014. 
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about how Abu Mansour can get visas for Finland to all those who wish for secularism 
in Syria and Iraq.76 
 
Figure 13.  A screen capture from an ISIS video on which a fighter from Finland answers questions asked by 
the audience and refers to Finland 
 
Figure 14.  A screen capture from an ISIS video on which a fighter from Finland answers questions asked by 
the audience and refers to Finland 
                                                     
 
76 “Daily: Man Claims to Be Finnish in ISIS Video”, Yle 14 June 2014. 
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3.2 Jihadist online content produced in 
Finnish or by persons with a link to 
Finland 
Especially in 2013–2014, activity in support of troops fighting against the Syrian 
government was relatively prolific in Finland, including showing an interest in and 
sympathy for jihadist movements. At that time, the conflict in Iraq and Syria was at its 
early stage and the activities of ISIS, for example, were only taking shape. The 
declaration of ISIS’s caliphate in 2014 also attracted widespread attention among 
those following the conflict, and few restrictions were placed on the activities of 
persons supporting ISIS on the social media as yet. 
In the early stage of the conflict, a number of persons living in Finland had social 
media profiles in which they openly expressed their support for movements fighting 
against Assad, and later for ISIS. These accounts also discussed religious themes 
openly and shared pro-ISIS content. Foreign fighters who travelled to Syria also kept 
in touch with their friends living in Finland and their networks on the social media, and 
thus contributed to getting across a picture of the situation in the conflict zone and 
shared content produced by the groups they supported. In addition to the small core 
group of fighters who went to Syria and Iraq, there were also others who disseminated 
jihadist content in general and provided passive support for the ideology.  
This situation changed after 2014, however, as ISIS's violent videos and the terror 
attacks linked to the organisation in Europe resulted in more stringent 
countermeasures on the social media. The public profiles of foreign fighters and ISIS 
supporters have since been deleted, and jihadist communication, especially in 
Western languages, has been extensively blocked on the social media.  
At the international level, a great deal is known about the social media activities of the 
supporters of different jihadist groups. Attempts have been made to structure the 
diversity of producers and consumers of online jihadist content by means of various 
typologies. As discussed in the previous Chapter, these typologies have addressed 
not only different types of actors and networks and their potential motivations for 
spreading jihadist content but also different content and themes that the produced and 
disseminated material has covered.  
In this study, we use a division of the activities into two categories, which is 
compatible with the Finnish data: the first one contains militant jihadists. In the Finnish 
context, this mainly means foreign fighters from Finland and their families. The 
second category contains the producers, disseminators and translators of jihadist 
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content. It includes other persons with links to Finland who have been actively 
involved in producing and/or disseminating jihadist content on the social media or 
translated it, for example from Arabic into Finnish. 
The latter category also includes so-called keyboard jihadists, who are sometimes 
seen as a separate category. This refers to persons who support the activities of 
jihadist movements by sharing content or commenting on threads related to it. In other 
words, their activities are in many ways similar to those of producers, disseminators 
and translators. However, keyboard jihadists do not participate in activities outside the 
web or social media, meaning that they are mainly passive supporters and 
consumers.  In international research, they have been referred to by such terms as 
‘jihobbyists’77 or ‘jihadi fan boys/girls’.78 While ‘only being active online’ may sound like 
‘larping’ jihadist activism without an actual intention of doing anything in concrete 
terms, the online behaviour of these keyboard jihadists has significantly affected the 
visibility of jihadist content, for example on the social media. 
While the classification described above helps to structure the phenomenon, the 
categories are not straightforward in practice, and their boundaries are blurred. For 
instance, the same person may support the movements by different means at different 
times. 
The material analysed in this study is predominantly Finnish and English-language 
content. As persons interested in jihadism are a very fragmented group in Finland in 
terms of both their level of organisation and their backgrounds, this material is unlikely 
to cover all social media content with links to Finland, already for the reason that 
persons who were interested in jihadist activity and travelled to the conflict zone as 
foreign fighters are known to have also communicated in several other languages, 
including Kurdish, Bengali, Somali and Arabic. We will come back to this point in the 
following Chapter. 
  
                                                     
 
77 See Maura Conway. “From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence and Development of an 
Online Radical Milieu”, CTX: Combating Terrorism Exchange 2, no 4 (2012), 2. 
78 See Maura Conway. “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: 
Six Suggestions for Progressing Research”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no 1 (2016), 86. 
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3.2.1 Militant jihadists 
The material produced and shared by those who travelled to Syria and Iraq is a key 
part of jihadist content related to Finland. Such usually pro-ISIS content could earlier 
be found on several platforms, the most important ones of which perhaps are 
Facebook and Twitter. Fighters also communicated on other channels, including 
various online forums or platforms such as Ask.fm, on which fighters living in Syria 
and Iraq answered questions about life under ISIS among other things.  
3.2.1.1 Facebook 
The Facebook activities of those who travelled to Syria and Iraq were particularly 
prolific and open in 2013–2014 before Facebook started actively deleting content and 
profiles and  before public support for ISIS generally started to attract more extensive 
attention and disapproval both in Finland and elsewhere in Europe. 
The archived profiles build a diverse picture of the themes, content and visual material 
circulating on the social media in the early days of the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Often 
using their own names, fighters who left Finland for Syria described the war and their 
life under ISIS in their profiles. They could directly announce in their profiles that they 
had already relocated to Syria, and they often put up pictures of themselves with the 
black flag of ISIS and weapons. In the screen capture below, a foreign fighter who 
travelled to Syria gives Aleppo in Syria as his home and ”Calling to Allah” as his job. 
In his profile picture he poses with an assault rifle, his face covered by a scarf.  
The second screen capture depicts the profile of a woman who says she lives in 
Raqqah in Syria and who has the ISIS flag in her profile picture. In the third one, a 
person who has moved to Syria has replaced their profile picture with a pro-ISIS 
poster.  In the fourth screen capture, the fighter's profile contains very strong pro-ISIS 
imagery, which was common in foreign fighters’ profiles. Posts with jihadist content 
were mostly put up after the person had already left for the conflict zone, even if some 
profiles have shared jihadist content even before this.  
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Figure 15. The profile of a foreign fighter with an assault rifle 
 
 
Figure 16. The profile of a woman with the ISIS flag 
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Figure 17. The profile of another woman with pro-ISIS imagery 
 
 
Figure 18. A man’s profile with a typical visual look supporting ISIS 
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Some Facebook messages also contained violent threats and bluster against the 
Western countries typical of ISIS. The following screen capture shows a woman in a 
niqab carrying an AK-47 assault rifle and possibly a bomb intended for a suicide 
attack. In her post mixing Finnish and English, the woman issues threats against Shia 
Muslims.  
 
Figure 19. A woman dressed in a niqab with an assault rifle on Facebook  
This Facebook post attracted the interest of the Finnish media and the attention of the 
authorities.79 Yle, for instance, published an article on the woman's social media 
activities. This Yle article was shared further on the social media, where the woman’s 
Facebook friends commented on it. The screen capture on the following page shows 
how a Facebook friend of the woman commented on Yle’s article with the words “My 
friend” and love hearts. 
                                                     
 
79 “Suomalainen mahdollinen naisjihadisti uhkailee shiiamuslimeja Facebookissa”, Yle 19 June 
2014. 
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Figure 20. Yle article on a ‘potential female jihadist’ is shared on Facebook with comments 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Facebook posts which describe everyday problems under ISIS rule80 
                                                     
 
80 In this context, hisbah refers to ISIS’s religious police. 
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Active efforts to delete the profiles of fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq and their 
families from Facebook started after 2014. Since then, the number of publicly 
accessible profiles and posts has been much lower. 
3.2.1.2 Twitter 
Twitter has been at least equally essential as a social media platform for ISIS’s online 
communication and the networking of those interested in the movement’s activities as 
Facebook. However, the Twitter material available for this study was not as inclusive 
as the Facebook content, and making conclusions on its basis is thus more difficult. 
While Twitter was an important communication channel, especially for fighters who 
went to Syria and Iraq, its nature as a medium is different, and perhaps for this reason 
it has had fewer Finland-specific features and content . Most Twitter communication 
by Finns that we know about took place in English and was not specifically about 
Finland. As studies on the activities of European ISIS fighters on Twitter have found, 
Twitter was often used as an alternative channel for finding out what was happening 
among the fighters in Syria and Iraq. International research has also shown that 
Twitter was used widely for the purpose of recruiting new fighters.81 While it is of 
course possible that this also happened in Finland, we have not found clear examples 
in the data in which a Finnish foreign fighter in Syria or Iraq would have targeted open 
recruitment attempts particularly at a Finnish audience on Twitter. 
The following section discusses some examples of Finnish foreign fighters’ activities 
on Twitter, especially in 2014⎼2015, when Twitter was the communication platform of 
choice for ISIS fighters. All these accounts have since been deleted, which makes it 
difficult to have a clear overall idea of the scope of the activity at a later date. All 
indications point to references and links to Finland being fairly marginal in this 
content, too, even if some foreign fighters from Finland attracted international 
attention with their Twitter activities. A review of 9.3 million tweets in the Shadows of 
ISIS material collected by the international organisation TRAC did not find relevant 
new references to Finland.   
A good example of Finnish fighters’ communication on Twitter is the activities of a 
man who used the fighter name Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi. Yle also wrote a few articles 
about the social media activities of this man, who was a Finnish convert, and 
nicknamed him ‘ISIS-Joni’.82 According to his own account, Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi 
                                                     
 
81 Carter et al., #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter 
Networks. 
82 Sara Rigatelli, “ISIS-soturi Jonin taustat: Yksinäinen nettieläjä, joka vihasi armeijaa ja haki 
yliopistoon.” Yle 25 February 2015; Sara Rigatelli, “ISIS-soturi Joni kertoo Ylelle: En ole vielä 
päässyt tappamaan”, Yle 25 February 2015. This case is also discussed in the report Jihadism in 
Finland. 
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came from a small locality and discovered ISIS’s ideology mainly through online 
communication and interaction.  He later travelled to Syria to fight and was highly 
active mainly on Twitter, where he described his life under ISIS, but he also used 
such other channels as Ask.fm.  
The screen capture below shows one of Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi’s several Twitter 
profiles which he kept creating as they were taken down by Twitter. Typically for ISIS 
fighters, his profile picture shows an AK-47 assault rifle and a flag. In his tweet, Abu 
Ibrahim al-Finlandi describes how he shows pictures of Finnish people to other 
fighters on Google and how they laugh at them together.  
 
 
Figure 22. One of Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi’s many Twitter accounts 
In the following screen capture, he writes about how he has left the diabolical/infidel 
(taghuut) Finland and how Dawlat Islam (the Islamic state) is now his home. He also 
relates in Finnish how he has left Finland’s “false gods including the flag with a blue 
cross and the house of parliament” behind for ever. 
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Figure 23. Screen captures from Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi's Twitter chats 
A good example of the Twitter activities of people living in Syria and Iraq was Umm 
Irhab’s Twitter account, which also attracted international attention. The screen 
capture below shows one of Umm Irhab’s accounts; the profile picture highlights 
religious themes, including the mosque and the niqab. In her profile, she describes 
herself as “a sister just trying to get closer to Allah”.  
 
 
Figure 24. A screen capture from Umm Irhab’s Twitter profile   
In her Twitter communication, Umm Irhab often approached life and religious issues 
from a woman’s perspective, but she also shows that she actively supports ISIS’s 
extreme violence. In the screen capture below, she speaks approvingly of the public 
execution of the American James Foley. 
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Figure 25. Screen captures from Umm Irhab’s Twitter discussions in which she supports ISIS's acts of 
violence 
Umm Irhab’s Twitter account is interesting in that it was also noted in international 
discussions as an example of how women actively participate in supporting ISIS and 
its ideology.83  
3.2.1.3 Ask.fm and other online forums 
Finnish fighters and their spouses who travelled to Syria and Iraq also contributed to 
Askbook and Ask.Fm from their destination. Askbook and Ask.fm, which are available 
both in Finnish and English, are social networking platforms based on questions and 
answers. The threads of persons who left Finland for Syria and Iraq are typically 
about life under the rule of ISIS and different practical and religious matters 
associated with it. A good example of this type of communication is the activities of 
the aforementioned Abu Ibrahim Finlandi. He was active on both platforms and 
answered questions about living under ISIS in Finnish and English. In the screen 
                                                     
 
83 See e.g. Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford & Ross Frenet, Becoming Mulan? Female Western 
Migrants to ISIS (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016), https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.pdf.  
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capture below, he answers questions he was asked about such topics as his attitude 
to the executions of innocent people and soldiers by ISIS or whether he ever intends 
to go back to Finland. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Screen captures from Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi's discussions on Ask.fm 
Other foreign fighters from Finland have also had Ask.fm accounts. It is impossible to 
know how inclusive the archive of threads on this platform accessible to the 
researchers was, and the accounts have since been deleted. The accounts archived 
for research use in 2014⎼2015 create the impression that interaction between fighters 
and those interested in their lives was relatively active on these platforms. The screen 
captures below show that Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi answered at least 325 questions, 
and his profile and answers had at least 68 likes.  
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Figure 27. Screen captures from Abu Ibrahim al-Finlandi's Ask.fm profile 
Similar interaction between fighters and those interested in their lives and ideas also 
took place in Finnish online forums, including the Islamic chatroom Tulevaisuus.org.  
In this context, we should note that the chatroom was not pro-ISIS in itself, even if the 
organisation was discussed in a positive tone in some of its threads. In the screen 
capture below from August 2014, a person using the name Greenbird comments on 
their life under ISIS's rule. Among other things, they relate how they moved out of 
Finland with a large back bag and a small rucksack and how, because of the war, 
they are forced to constantly move around.  
 
Figure 28. A screen capture from threads discussing ISIS in tulevaisuus.org chatrooms 
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While such discussions about life under ISIS cannot necessarily be regarded as 
examples of jihadist online communication, they reflect the many ways in which the 
new online platforms enabled diverse communication between fighters who went to 
Syria and persons living in Finland who were interested in going, or supported those 
who left, especially around 2014. This was additionally not only interaction between 
those who asked and answered questions, as the threads could also be followed by 
others. 
3.2.2 Producers, disseminators and translators 
In addition to the personal posts of fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq, sharing 
jihadist content and threads discussing religious themes have been widespread on 
the social media. For example, several highly significant accounts disseminating such 
content were active on the social media, and the holders of these accounts to a great 
extent acted independently from jihadist organisations. While all these persons have 
not been identified with certainty, those who have been are not known to include 
persons who live or lived in Finland, apart from the Twitter account @mujahid4life, 
which even attracted international attention. We are also not aware of any other 
indications of significant production or dissemination of content related to ISIS, for 
example, from Finland.  
Some pro-jihadism content has also been produced in Finnish, and it has been 
publicly available on websites and in online forums. As a significant part of the publicly 
available content has already been taken down, it is now difficult to form a 
comprehensive idea of its scale and importance in earlier years. It is unlikely that the 
volume of this content has been high, and a significant share of it has been saved for 
research purposes. On the other hand, it is difficult to say much about the readers of 
this content.  
Apart from social media profiles, the production and dissemination of jihadist online 
content in Finnish appears to have concentrated on a handful of sites, and the 
number of persons who actively produced it has been extremely small. To a great 
extent, the low volume of Finnish content can probably be explained by the small 
number of Finnish speakers, together with the fact that level of jihadism among those 
speaking Finnish as their native language has been low and that it is in many ways a 
relatively new phenomenon.  
In terms of the subject of this study, the most important online content produced in 
Finnish was a website called An-Nida-media, which disseminated pro-ISIS content for 
a short period. Additionally, some individuals have contributed to threads in Finnish 
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online forums where they have published communication inciting violent jihadism or 
supportive of ISIS. 
3.2.2.1 Activities of @Mujahid4life account on Twitter 
The example which is best known to international researchers and which has 
attracted the most attention of jihadist online communication linked to Finland is the 
Twitter activities of Abdullah al-Finlandi, a Finnish convert. He became known for his 
Twitter account @mujahid4life which actively supported ISIS, especially in the early 
stage of the conflict Syria in 2013–2014.84 The screen capture below shows Abdullah 
al-Finlandi’s Twitter profile from the time when he still was an active ISIS supporter. 
 
 
Figure 29. A screen capture from Abdullah al-Finlandi’s Twitter account @mujahid4life85 
At best, his @Mujahid4Life account had 11,000 followers, and it was the second most 
followed account of ISIS supporters in 2013⎼2014.  Abdullah al-Finlandi was highly 
active on Twitter and shared jihadist content extensively, including religious texts and 
news of battles.  
                                                     
 
84 Lara Whyte, "How the World's Safest Country Produced So Many ISIS Fighters", Vice 22 August 
2017, https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/bjj7zz/how-the-worlds-safest-country-produced-so-
many-isis-fighters. 
85 Screen capture from article by Whyte, "How the World's Safest Country”.  
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What we know about Abdullah al-Finlandi is limited to information provided in articles 
based on interviews with him.86 He became active on Twitter soon after the conflict in 
Syria began and originally supported al-Qaeda and its faction called Jabhat al-Nusra. 
However, he never travelled to Syria or Iraq. He has said that he was planning to 
travel to Syria and fight in the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra in spring 2013, but he 
abandoned this plan after an intervention by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. 
The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has not commented on this claim. As ISIS 
gained more influence, he started supporting it and actively shared different content 
associated with the organisation. He found this a much more effective way of 
operating and has later said that in his case, travelling to Syria would have been a 
waste of resources. 
In August 2014, Abdullah al-Finlandi’s Twitter account was deleted, apparently after 
he had shared images of journalist James Foley’s execution. He said he had already 
started having reservations about his support for ISIS, and after this incident he 
withdrew from the social media. Today he is an active opponent of ISIS’s activities. 
While he has described his earlier role as an ISIS supporter in media interviews, he 
has also made an obvious attempt to limit the information available on him. He 
currently has a new Twitter account, which he does not appear to use very actively. 
3.2.2.2 Hussein al-Maadidi’s writings 
As we already noted in the Introduction, there may be online content produced or 
shared by persons who live or have lived in Finland which is difficult to link to Finland. 
One case in which the Finnish connection is possible to track down is Hussein al-
Maadidi. Originally from Iraq, he is a journalist who lived in Finland for several years in 
the 2010s. 
Information about al-Maadidi’s background has been obtained mostly from press 
interviews he gave while living in Finland. When still living in Iraq, he worked as a 
journalist and wrote for several different media and news agencies, both in his own 
country and internationally. During the war in Iraq in late 2003, however, he was 
seized and sent to prison for a term which was a life sentence in practice. After 
spending approximately one year in Abu Ghraib prison, he was unexpectedly 
released. Once released, he continued to work as a journalist but said his situation 
became so difficult that he was forced to leave Iraq in autumn 2007. He finally ended 
up as a quota refugee in Finland. He said in an interview that he lived in Finland until 
2015, in which year he moved back to Iraq on a temporary basis. In 2013 he 
                                                     
 
86 "The Bullied Finnish Teenager who became an ISIS Social Media Kingpin - and then got out", 
Newsweek 6 May 2015; Sonja Saarikoski, “Sinun puolestas elää ja kuolla”, LongPlay #59 (2017). 
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published a book where he related his experiences, especially from his time in 
prison.87 
Quite obviously, the book Here in the Land of Caliphate published in 2015 by a 
journalist named Hussein al-Maadidi was also written by the same person. In this 
book, al-Maadidi describes his visit to the caliphate in late 2014⎼early 2015 when he 
was still living in Finland. Parts of this text were also published online, first in Arabic 
and soon also in English. Sections of the book were uploaded to a number of different 
websites, and it has also been disseminated by the pro-ISIS Al-Batār Media 
Foundation, which has published a great deal of jihadist material. Al-Maadidi has also 
appeared on YouTube videos containing similar ideas. These videos were available 
earlier but have since been taken down. 
Al-Maadidi reports on his trip to Mosul in a tone that is appreciative of the ISIS 
caliphate, describing the vibrant life in areas ruled by it and the friendliness of the 
persons he encountered. In his description, he repeatedly juxtaposes life in the 
caliphate with the brutal image given of ISIS on the media and stresses the difference 
between live under ISIS and the repressive atmosphere of fear, which according to 
him prevailed in Iraq before ISIS’s rule. The text also talks about Shias, Kurds and 
Americans in a very negative tone.  
His writings create a strong impression that his sympathies for such actors as ISIS 
have continued for years, and that he has written for jihadist online forums even 
before the period examined in this study. Little is known of al-Maadidi's activities in 
Finland, but in the course of the study, indications were found that he had known 
some persons who left Finland for Syria and Iraq.  
3.2.2.3 An-Nida 
The most relevant example of Finnish online content showing open support for ISIS is 
a blog titled An-Nida. This site was active between August 2016 and October 2017 
and, among other things, it published speeches by the leader of ISIS and articles from 
ISIS online magazines as Finnish translations. The identity of the person who 
maintained the site is not known for certain. As Wordpress has since deleted the site, 
we also do not know exactly what the scale of the site’s publication activities was and 
how many readers it had. By using the online archive of archive.org and archive 
material saved by researchers in earlier years, however, it has been possible to form 
                                                     
 
87 E.g. Angélique Ferrat & Hajar Smouni, Hundreds of journalists forced into exile in five years 
since launch of US-led invasion in Iraq. Reporters without Borders (2008); “Hussein al-Maadidi”, 
SixDegrees 18 June 2013, http://www.6d.fi/index.php/wemet/612-hussein-al-maadidi; Heidi Höök, 
“Irakissa ihmisellä on vähemmän arvoa kuin eläimellä länsimaissa”, Pakolainen 4/2013; Jeanette 
Östman, “Pennan och kameran är mina vapen”, Österbottens tidning 24 July 2015. 
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a general idea of the type of content and threads found on the site when it was still 
publicly accessible online.   
An-Nida published 18 articles in Finnish, which comprised both text and visual 
content, including images and calendars as well as posters and pictures with religious 
themes.  The screen captures below show how An-Nida disseminated ISIS’s jihadist 
content, including the aforementioned article in Dabiq magazine, in which reference 
was made to Finland. An-Nida additionally published Finnish translations of such texts 
as speeches by ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and the organisation’s information 
officer, Abu Hassan al-Muhajir. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Screen captures from visual content on An-Nida website 
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Good examples of An-Nida’s activities include an article published in January 2017 
titled "You Will Remember what I have told you", which contained typical themes 
associated with violent jihadism and, in particular, those common in pro-ISIS 
publications. The excerpt below refers to key themes of ISIS, which have been 
translated into Finnish in the article: 
O hosts of Iraq and Sham! O ghuraba of Islam! The camp of lies has been bewildered by the transitory world, 
led astray by lust, and it has become vain. Shaytan made conceit go into their heads. So it rose senselessly, 
showed itself proudly, foamed angrily and trembled with fear, and launched a campaign against the 
stronghold of Islam and the land of Khilafa, the likes of which history has not experienced in recent times. 
Here are crusading America and Europe, ex-communist Russia, fire-worshipping Iran, secularist Turkey, 
Kurdish atheists, Raafidah, Nusyayriyyah, shahawaat, militias, Arab tahguuts and their soldiers, all in a line, 
armed with modern weaponry, accompanied by their filthy and garish media, all of which have the same 
motto: “bring down Islam and its people”, and the same logic [as did the infidels of ’Aadi when they said], 
“Who is mightier than us?” (Fussilat 15). 
This text is a direct translation into Finnish from content spread by ISIS. Among other 
things, it contains numerous references to key themes that also appeared in such 
magazines as Dabiq and Rumiyah, including references to the hosts of Iraq and Sham 
as well as to America and Europe as crusaders.  
An article titled “Kafir Blood is Halal to you”, which was published in 2017, also 
attracted the attention of the mainstream media.  This article is a direct translation 
from the first issue of ISIS's Rumiyah magazine, and it talks approvingly of violence 
against infidels, for example as follows:  
Muslims who now live in Dar al-Kufri should remember that the blood of infidels is halal, and killing them is a 
form of worship of Allah – the Lord, King and God of humankind. This includes a businessman in a taxi on his 
way to work, youth (‘children’ past puberty) taking exercise in the park, and an old man queueing for a 
sandwich. Indeed, even shedding the blood of a kafir selling flowers to passers-by from a kiosk is halal – and 
sowing terror in the hearts of all infidels is the duty of a Muslim. There is no shar’ii requirement of aiming at 
soldiers, police officers or judges and politicians, as all kafirs who are not under the dhimma agreement are 
free game.  
Images and graphics from Rumiyah were used in the article directly. The screen 
captures below show the visual similarities between the English and the Finnish 
version. For example, An-Nida uses the same picture of a bloody knife. 
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Figure 31. An example of the similar visual imagery on An-Nida site and in ISIS's Rumiyah magazine 
While this article is mainly a translation, some references to Finland have been 
included in it. For instance, an image of a man dressed in a shell suit taking exercise 
in the forest has been added to the end of the article.  The caption under the image 
says “thus do not even let a Nordic walker to walk all the way home”, which invokes 
the impression that the article wishes to incite to acts of violence at people in Finland. 
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Figure 32. A screen capture from images in an article titled ‘Kafir blood is halal to you’ published on  
An-Nida site 
Several other ISIS publications in a similar style, often translated into Finnish word for 
word, were released on An-Nida. It should also be noted that even if the site was 
active for a year, there are no comments on its articles. This is not uncommon for 
blog-type websites, of course. We do not know how popular this site was and to what 
extent it was read. The site was deleted soon after its existence became more widely 
known to the authorities and journalists.   
The last fact worth mentioning about An-Nida is that in one of its final articles in 
January 2017, the readers were urged to join the site maintainers’ Telegram channel 
if they wish to read more ISIS publications. The article only contains the address of 
An-Nida’s Telegram channel. This site is an example of how, due to 
countermeasures, jihadist content has been moved to so-called encrypted channels 
also in Finland, or at the very least, plans to move it have existed. The screen capture 
on the following page shows a link to a Telegram channel on which the writer claims 
Finnish translations of ISIS publications are available. The channel has since been 
deleted. 
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Figure 33. The last post on An-Nida urges readers to go to a Telegram channel where ISIS publications 
would be available 
3.2.2.4 Writings on Islamtieto website 
Chats with jihadist sympathies can also be found on certain open discussion 
platforms. The best-known example of this are the writings of Abdullah Rintala. 
Rintala has translated and published under his own name a large selection of 
religious material. On Islamtieto website, he has participated actively in discussions 
on different religious themes for years, writing numerous comments that support 
radical interpretations of Islam and abusing Shias and other infidels. In addition to 
Rintala, for example a person using the pseudonym Ummuyusuf have shared partly 
similar views on the website. 
Among other things, Rintala’s comments included strong language inciting to violence 
combined with disdain for and hostility against Shia Muslims, in particular. For 
example, he wrote that "we Muslims hate Shias as they have the power and full 
international freedom to kill Muslims in Iraq and Syria, and no-one can stop them. This 
is why us ‘Finnish-speaking jihadists’ must ourselves go to Syria to wipe out Shias 
with Kalashnikovs and put them into mass graves.” Rintala also actively showed 
support for the foreign fighters who went to Syria and Iraq. His comments in the same 
chatroom include “this is why us Muslims have to give our full support to ISIS”, or “it is 
not necessary to learn how to build bombs or carry out suicide attacks in order to 
shed blood, it is enough to know how to use automatic weapons”.  
As a result of his writings on Islamtieto website, Abdullah Rintala was sentenced for 
aggravated ethnic agitation in October 2017. In addition to being active on Islamtieto, 
Rintala has made literature supporting jihadism available as Finnish translations and 
published it on such content sharing platforms as Scribd. The content he shared also 
included publications of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  
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3.2.2.5 Dissemination of radical religious  
material of a more generic nature 
When we talk about disseminating material important for jihadist activity, it is at the 
same time both essential and extremely difficult to draw a line between jihadist 
content and other religious and political material. When the content includes direct 
incitement to violence, it is easy to identify it as jihadist material. In addition, however, 
those interested in jihadism read plenty of other material besides content produced by 
the movements they support, and this material is equally essential in laying down the 
ideological foundation for jihadist movements. Such material also includes many types 
of salafist or wahhabist content. 
A highly important body of such material is comprised by radical religious sermons 
and texts (which do not necessarily contain direct incitement to violence). A good 
example of this type of material associated with jihadism are the sermons of the 
radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki. Awlaki was considered one of the most influential 
theoreticians and preachers of modern jihadism who, based in Yemen, also planned 
al-Qaeda attacks in Western countries. He is also considered a key ideologist in the 
context of using the Internet to support jihadist activity and recruitment. Additionally, 
however, Awlaki has published plenty of religious online material that does not directly 
incite violence.  
Drawing a line between jihadist material that directly incites violence or supports it on 
the one hand, and more general religious material based on a similar worldview on 
the other, is open to interpretation. In Finland, the greatest difficulty in drawing this 
line is perhaps encountered in the case of material distributed by such actors as the 
Iqra-Islam association. The association's Facebook profile is one of the groups and 
profiles that have disseminated content essential for jihadism (in the wider sense 
described above), especially in the early years of the conflict in Syria and Iraq in 
2012–2014. In the two screen captures below, links to Awlaki’s videos are shared on 
the association’s Facebook page, both through its own and other parties’ Facebook 
pages.   
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Figure 34. A Facebook group shares a link to a sermon by Anwar al-Awlaki on another user’s wall. 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Iqra-Islam association shares a link to a sermon by Anwar al-Awlaki on its own wall 
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Iqra-Islam association was established in the early 2000s, and it announces that its 
objective is translating literature on Islam into Finnish and disseminating it. As a rule, 
the translated literature has emphasised such material as that represented by the 
Islamic University of Madinah. The convert mainly responsible for its work has also 
been active in other ways and participated in Finnish social media discussions.  Last 
year, the association's blog explained that the association is about to become active 
again in delivering Qurans and other religious material to prisons, while it was also 
increasing the range of languages in which the material was to be available.88  
As noted before, while the material disseminated by the association is not exclusively 
jihadist, especially when examined as a whole, it contains texts that are also important 
for jihadist movements. 
Similar material that, while not actually jihadist, is also important for jihadist 
movements can be found among videos. An example of this are two videos published 
in 2013, which contain religious material aiming to recruit fighters for the war in Syria 
and which were shared on the social media in the early years of the conflict in Syria 
and Iraq. The original videos were in Arabic, but a Finnish translation had been added 
on top of the Arabic text. At the time this study was conducted, both videos were still 
publicly available on YouTube, where they had been viewed a few hundred times. 
Judging by  the alias, the account may belong to a Finnish person who visited Syria 
before the caliphate was declared. 
On the first video, “Declaration from the community of religious scholars in Syria”, 
Syrian scholars explain why orthodox Muslims should join the fight against Assad. It 
provides numerous examples of how Assad’s atrocities oblige Muslims to join the 
front against him. The second video, ”Mujahid's message from the holy land of 
Levant” contains a soundtrack describing life in Syria and also urges Muslims to join 
the fight in Iraq. The soundtrack is accompanied by an image from Syria, where 
smoke is rising in the background as an illustration of battles and war. 
Whether or not these videos can be regarded as part of jihadist online communication 
is not clear.  They do not contain themes directly associated with violent jihadism or, 
for example, direct references to ISIS. On the other hand, however, these videos have 
been used in the Facebook profiles of foreign fighters who went to Syria and Iraq.  
                                                     
 
88 “Uusia tuulia…”, 23 April 2018, https://iqraislamkirjat.wordpress.com/2018/04/23/uusia-tuulia/. 
About the association, see also Juntunen et al., Suomesta Syyrian ja Irakin konfliktikentälle 
suuntautuva liikkuvuus, 23–24. 
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3.2.2.6 Jihadist ‘memes’ and other visual content 
The final category in the data were so-called jihadist ‘memes’ and other visual content 
which was shared on the social media in the early years of the conflict in Syria and 
Iraq. This content rehashed themes typical of jihadist communication and drew on the 
extensive visual production of ISIS, in particular. Such content has not been archived 
for research as widely as the profiles of those who travelled to the conflict zone, for 
example, and analysing the phenomenon at a later date is thus difficult. It should also 
be stressed that we do not know how widely this type of content was shared, or how 
many persons have actively produced or disseminated it. The images show pro-ISIS 
“memes” translated into Finnish that were shared on the social media around 2014. 
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Figure 36. Screen captures from pro-ISIS Finnish visual material shared on the social media 
In addition, high volumes of visual material and memes supporting jihadism that were 
similar in style but in English were shared on the social media in 2014⎼2018.  As this 
content was neither produced in Finland nor specifically targeted at Finland, it is not 
discussed in greater detail in this report.89 It is known, however, that ISIS has also 
actively trained its supporters to produce this type of visual material on such channels 
as Telegram.  However, the study did not find any references with particular links to 
Finland in these activities.90  
  
                                                     
 
89 See Laura Huey, “This is Not Your Mother's Terrorism: Social Media, Online Radicalization and 
the Practice of Political Jamming.”, Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International 
Relations 6, no 2 (2015), 1–16. 
90 Gilad Shiloach, "Where ISIS Fanboys Learn Graphic Design", Vocativ 31 January 2017, 
https://www.vocativ.com/398135/where-isis-fanboys-learn-graphic-design/index.html. 
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3.2.3 Telegram and encrypted channels  
As noted in the Introduction, the study did not look at such closed channels as 
Telegram, as this was not possible within the limits of the available resources. Based 
on earlier research in jihadist online communication, we know that a significant part of 
activities supporting jihadism and especially ISIS has been transferred to Telegram 
and other encrypted platforms.  
What we do not know, however, is how extensive and prolific Finnish activities on 
different Telegram channels have been. The Finnish Nidafin channel, which was 
linked to An-Nida-media, has already been taken down. Abderrahman Bouanane, who 
perpetrated the knife attack in Turku, is known to have watched jihadist content on 
Telegram in the weeks preceding the attack and possibly written some comments on 
it. He also recorded a video manifesto on a mobile phone, which he published just 
before carrying out the attack on at least three Telegram channels. Apart from this 
incident, the relevance of these Telegram channels to Finland is questionable, 
however, as they mainly operate in Arabic and are not produced in Finland.91 
Even though communication on Telegram was not examined, we did consult a 
number of international researchers who actively monitor communication on Telegram 
and have saved large sets of Telegram content. There were few or no observations 
related to Finland in any of these sets. While this does not mean that persons living or 
having lived in Finland do not participate in Telegram discussions, the complete 
absence of hits indicates that persons or channels having attracted international 
attention which could be easily linked to Finland do not appear to be active on 
Telegram. The possibility of Finnish activities related to this theme continuing on 
Telegram, too, cannot be excluded either.  
                                                     
 
91 Piia Leino and Olli-Pekka Paajanen, "KRP: Turun puukottaja ihannoi ISISiä ja näki itsensä 
"ISISin sotilaana", Keskisuomalainen 7 December 2018.  
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4 Conclusions 
The purpose of this report was to produce the first ever study on jihadist online 
communication related to Finland in 2014⎼2018. The study charted and analysed 
jihadist content that was openly available online during that period. The report began 
with a review of the international development of jihadist online communication, 
making it possible to put observations significant for Finland in a broader context and 
assess their importance. The report then moved on to discuss references to Finland 
and the appearance of persons linked to Finland in jihadist online communication as 
well as the types of textual, video and other visual content persons who lived or had 
lived in Finland have shared and produced on different online platforms and channels. 
4.1 Key findings  
The key findings of the study can be summed up as follows: 
 More jihadist online communication related to Finland than ever before 
existed in the early years of the conflict in Syria and Iraq. By online 
communication related to Finland we mean in this report content that either 
was about Finland, that was produced by persons living/having lived in 
Finland, or that was produced in Finnish. Internationally, the volume of jihadist 
online communication, and especially content produced in Western 
languages, has increased significantly in recent years.  
 This change should not be exaggerated, however, as the volume of 
communication related to Finland remains relatively small by international 
standards.  Additionally, the advancing digitalisation of societies has affected 
this change at least as much as aspects specifically associated with Finland. 
The wider use of the social media, in particular, has made it easier than ever 
before to produce and share content, even with meagre resources. 
 Finland and persons from Finland have featured in publications and videos 
produced by ISIS a few times. Persons originating from Finland have 
appeared in articles and videos intended for Western audiences in general 
(including the Finnish audiences). They feature persons originating from 
several European countries, and it is likely that those coming from the distant 
Finland have been mainly included for effect and that the added value of 
Finland has been rather symbolic. 
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 Many of those who have travelled to Syria and Iraq from Finland have been 
active on the social media. In addition to everyday interaction, these activities 
have included reporting on local conditions, answering questions asked by 
other people about them, and also encouraging others to travel to Syria or 
Iraq. The communication has additionally contained some threats against 
Finland. These activities appear to have been the most prolific on Facebook 
and Twitter, while similar content can also be found on such discussion 
platforms as Ask.fm.   
 Persons who are and were living in Finland have disseminated and in some 
cases also produced jihadist content in Finnish. The majority of the content 
available and distributed outside the social media, including on websites and 
in blogs or discussion forums, has been translated from other languages. The 
volume of Finnish material has been rather modest.   
 Persons living/having lived in Finland have also produced and disseminated 
jihadist content in other languages. The data available for this study indicate 
that the social media profiles with the highest international visibility were the 
Twitter accounts of Mujahid4life and Umm Irhabi, who operated in English. 
The probable reason for this is the international character of Twitter. On 
Twitter, the language of pro-ISIS threads related to Western countries 
generally was English. 
 As in other countries, open jihadist online communication related to Finland 
has declined significantly in the last three years as technology companies have 
launched active efforts to remove this type of content. Apart from a few 
exceptions, the content discussed in this study is no longer available online. 
The time for open jihadist online communication is to a great extent over, also 
regarding content related to Finland or published in Finnish. 
 While the openly accessible content relevant to Finland has almost 
completely disappeared from sight, this does not mean that it no longer exists. 
The research data indicate that it has existed, and may continue to exist, on 
such closed and encrypted channels as Telegram. However, a separate study 
would be needed to investigate closed channels. 
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4.2 Significance of jihadist online 
communication for Finland 
What, then, is the significance of these observations for Finland? The fact that Finland 
has been mentioned in ISIS publications and that Finnish speakers have been seen 
on jihadist videos has attracted attention and elicited questions, especially since this 
is a new phenomenon in many ways. News of Abu Shu’ayb as-Somali appearing on 
an ISIS video and the stories of female converts published in Dabiq and Rumiyah 
were released in all main media. They were also referred to later a number of times in 
news items related to this theme. Threats sent to Finnish politicians under the name 
of ISIS by a foreign fighter calling himself Abu Hurairah Finland received even more 
attention.92  
Over time, it was rather unanimously concluded from these cases that Finland had 
now become a target country for jihadist activity, and the threat level in Finland had 
increased. If the purpose of this communication was to make Finland experience itself 
more strongly as a potential target for ISIS, it was successful. Of course, many other 
factors besides ISIS’s online communication contributed to this.  
On the other hand, news reports on references to Finland or Finnish persons featured 
in jihadist content were strongly centered and limited to the national context. Finland’s 
almost non-existent role in jihadist communication in earlier decades was almost 
exclusively used as a point of comparison, whereas few attempts were made to put 
the recent developments in the international context of development in jihadist online 
communication. The national focus of the public discussion has also resulted in 
seeing the significance of jihadist online communication in a narrower sense than 
what would have been appropriate.  
The impacts of jihadist online communication on Finland are not limited to content 
linked to Finland, and the content in which ‘Finland is mentioned’ in one way or 
another is not always automatically the most essential in terms of Finland (either). The 
relationship between jihadist online communication and Finland is more complex than 
this. We will now turn into attempting to make sense of this multidimensional 
relationship.  
From a strictly national point of view, perhaps the most significant individual 
conclusion of this study concerns the image of Finland carried across by jihadist 
online communication. If this type of content begins to show a heavy emphasis on 
Finland as an enemy, it may influence the likelihood of attacks in Finland. Whereas 
                                                     
 
92 For more information on these threats, see the report Jihadism in Finland. 
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Finland was almost invisible before 2014, Finland has now appeared on the long list 
of ISIS’s enemies and it has also been referred to as a heathen country where 
orthodox Muslims are not understood.  At the same time, it should be noted that these 
references have been few and far between, and they do not add up to an image of 
Finland as an important target. Making threats such as those described in this report 
against different countries is common.  
In addition to the image communicated by jihadist content, an essential role is also 
played by the image of Finland in the mainstream media and the extent to which 
images created in jihadist content are filtered through to it. Denmark, for example, did 
not attract the attention of jihadist actors exclusively because of what was said in 
jihadist communication but also through the attention the cartoon controversy was 
given in the mainstream media. According to an initial investigation carried out for this 
study, Finland still has a relatively positive image in the Arabic mainstream media. 
Arabic media consider Finland a well-organised welfare state where human rights are 
respected and which attracts people because of its high standard of living, even if 
some critical articles have been published since 2015 and especially around the so-
called refugee crisis.93  
Featuring persons from Finland in jihadist magazines and videos was most likelya 
device mainly used for effect by ISIS. However, these articles and videos together 
with the social media activities of those who left Finland for Syria and Iraq are 
significant in the sense that they offer a point of identification for people interested in 
jihadism. Jihadist activism may no longer appear such a distant issue and possibility 
for someone living in Finland when you see persons like yourself participating in it. 
How strong an impact this ultimately has on the development of jihadist activity in 
Finland should not be overestimated. It is likely that the developments described in 
the report Jihadism in Finland related to establishing networks and contacts have a 
greater influence on it than the content discussed in this report.  
How much importance should we ascribe to the fact that jihadist content is (or is not) 
available in Finnish? The existence of Finnish jihadist content indicates that there are 
people interested in jihadist thinking among Finnish speakers. This was already 
evident from other sources, however. Theoretically, publishing jihadist content in a 
                                                     
 
93 As part of the more extensive international media environment in which violent jihadist online 
communication takes place, an analysis of how Finland has been discussed in Arabic media and 
those in the Middle East region was conducted in the course of the study. The analysis covered 
Al-Arabiya, Al-Jazeera, Al-Hurra, Al-Rasheed and Al-Sumaria.  Articles referring to Finland in 
these publications were collected using the keywords ادنلنف (Finland) and Finland.  
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new language increases the number of its potential readers. It is questionable if this 
has occurred in the case of Finnish. 
Based on the available information, forming a comprehensive overview of those 
involved and potentially interested in jihadist activism in Finland is difficult. What is 
known in any case is that this group of people has diverse language skills. Many of 
them have sufficient language proficiency to follow international channels in different 
languages or to participate in international online discussions with people from a 
similar cultural background. This includes a significant number of people who speak 
Finnish, some of them with native proficiency. At the same time, the majority of those 
whose native language is Finnish also speak other languages well, at least English. 
This has already allowed them to participate in discussions on numerous international 
channels that contain much more material.  
Jihadism in general is a strongly international phenomenon, and the networks related 
to it are rarely delimited by national boundaries. This is even more so with online 
communication. The producers and consumers of jihadist online communication are 
often not based in the same country. Online communication is produced in countless 
languages, and it is often also consumed in languages other than the audience’s 
native language.  It is thus unlikely that the existence of Finnish content is a crucial 
question for very many of those who wish to familiarise themselves with jihadist 
content.  
The social media and the possibilities it provides for virtual networking with persons 
interested in jihadism have led to a situation where it is easier than before to influence 
the thinking and actions of persons living in Finland, also from outside the country. 
The Ministry of Interior’s situation overview of violent extremism from 2014 refers to 
“radical Islamic mentors operating abroad who — by inciting hate speech and urging 
support for operations associated with terrorism — strive to exert influence on 
persons in other countries”.94 The Finnish National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
published in late 2018 also lists the “rise in radical Islamist propaganda” targeting 
Finland as a key factor that has raised the threat of terrorism against the country.95  
The number of these attempts and their evolution over time are difficult to assess 
based on the information currently available for the researchers. Neither was this one 
of the objectives of the study. Some examples of cases targeting Finland and 
attempts to exert influence have come up in public sources, however. For example, 
an ‘imam’ living in the Netherlands used the Internet to lure a young Finnish convert to 
Syria through online discussions in 2013⎼2014. This person spent almost two years in 
                                                     
 
94  Ministry of the Interior, Violent extremism in Finland — situation overview 1/2014, 7. 
95 Government resolution on the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2018–2021. 
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Syria before returning to Finland.96 The founder of the Salafist organisation al-
Muhajiroun which operated in the United Kingdom, Omar Bakri Muhammed, has 
hinted that he had facilitated the travel of Finnish fighters to Syria while based in 
Lebanon, but no indications of such activities were found in the sources used for the 
study.97 
While the open online communication examined in this study is part of this exertion of 
influence, closed one-to-one or small group discussions no doubt play a more 
important role.  Rather than being a direct consequence of the type of online 
communication analysed in this study, the new social relationships enabled by the 
Internet and one-to-one discussions through the web played a greater role in the case 
discussed above.  
As in social interaction in general, face-to-face communication and interaction through 
different media are in many ways interlinked also in the lives of those interested in 
jihadism. It is rare for people to be radicalised merely by finding jihadist content 
online; in most cases, the process has included face-to-face interaction, in connection 
with which the participants may have perused online content together.   
However, online communication may have helped to establish highly significant 
interpersonal relationships. The importance of both public online communication and 
communication among a smaller group not accessible to outsiders may have a more 
pronounced role when a person is living in an environment where it is difficult to find 
others interested in jihadism. In this case, the Internet may become the only way of 
establishing contacts with persons with a similar ideological disposition, at least in the 
initial stage of interest in the movements.  
This observation may be particularly significant for countries such as Finland, where 
the number of those attracted to jihadist activism is small and the phenomenon is 
mainly concentrated in cities. Some of those interested in travelling to Syria or Iraq, 
for example, have come from other parts of the country. The first contacts with 
jihadism of those persons living in more remote areas have inevitably been 
established online. The role of online communication in facilitating attachment to 
jihadist activity in Finland may in this respect have been particularly strong. Naturally, 
this is not a phenomenon specific to Finland alone, but it may be more pronounced 
due to the small size and regional concentration of the jihadist milieu.  
                                                     
 
96 “17-vuotias kantasuomalainen “Jouni” halusi tarkka-ampujaksi - Imaami värväsi ummikkopojan 
terroristiryhmään Syyriaan”, MTV Uutiset 19 September 2016.  
97 Kari Ahlberg, “Radikaali muslimisaarnaaja Libanonissa Yle Uutisille: Syyriassa kymmeniä 
suomalaistaistelijoita”, Yle 29 October 2013. 
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We should also be aware of the fact that producing and consuming jihadist online 
communication may comprise so-called keyboard jihadism. It is not linked to 
participation in violent activities or supporting them outside the web, nor does it 
necessary lead to such activities.  Similarly to a large part of communication online 
and on the social media, it does not necessarily lead to other types of jihadist 
activism. In the same vein, those involved in jihadism outside the Internet do not 
necessarily communicate online as much as before, or they are able to hide their 
tracks better using the new encrypted communication channels.  This is likely to 
become more common in the future as technology companies’ and authorities’ 
methods of deleting jihadist content advance further, and activists, in turn, invent new 
ways of avoiding detection.  Consequently, the relationship between online and offline 
activity is not straightforward in this respect, either, and it changes constantly with 
time. 
4.3 Needs for further research 
The objective of the study was to produce a structured overview of jihadist online 
communication linked to Finland. The findings of the present study together with the 
further reflections in this Chapter will hopefully prepare the ground for further research 
in the topic.   
Many essential questions still remain to be answered. This study focused exclusively 
on content that was openly available. Due to the authorities’ countermeasures, openly 
disseminating content supporting jihadist movements has become extremely difficult, 
and the majority of the material has thus migrated to encrypted channels or the 
darknet in recent years. Comprehensive monitoring of these new channels and 
following relevant discussions as they move from one channel to another on different 
online platforms require plenty of time and persistence. It was not possible within the 
framework of the present study. Further research should thus be carried out to 
investigate the following questions: 
 What type of jihadist content and interaction related to Finland can be found 
on closed channels and the darknet? 
 What impact has the deletion of social media accounts and websites had on 
jihadist online communication relevant to Finland? 
As the study has shown, in terms of understanding the significance of jihadist online 
communication, it is also crucial to analyse everything that happens around this 
communication, in other words the context in which such content is produced and 
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shared and the way in which it is consumed. How the content is used, who uses it and 
how it is interpreted is ultimately more significant than what can be found on the web. 
Research would be needed in at least the following topics: 
 Which online content have persons who left Finland for Syria and Iraq and 
other persons interested in jihadism living/having lived in Finland followed, 
shared and produced? 
 What type of online communication is associated with jihadism in Finland?  
What proportion of this communication is ‘Finnish’, and in what way is it linked 
to more extensive jihadist online communication and activism? 
In terms of analysing the significance of jihadist online communication, it is 
additionally not sufficient to examine its use and interpretation among potential and 
actual supporters of jihadism only. Researchers analyse the significance of jihadist 
online communication in the ‘new media ecology’ as the sum of three different factors. 
In addition to the production of jihadist online content, these factors include the way in 
which the mainstream media present and describe the threat posed by online content 
and the reasons for this threat, and how different audiences understand this content 
and its potential effects on radicalisation, including how descriptions of the topic in 
news media have influenced this broader understanding.98   
Research has shown that the large-scale attention received by jihadist online 
communication in mainstream media significantly accentuates its importance. While 
open jihadist content has been easy to access, its visibility and recognisability, and 
thus its potential impact, increase significantly when it is discussed by the mainstream 
media. ISIS and many other jihadist groups have learned to use the media buzz 
caused by their online communication to gain more influence.  
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When we investigate the significance and impacts of online communication, we thus 
also need to analyse how different audiences interpret and consume this content, or 
even actively oppose to it. In concrete terms, this may mean analysing the following 
questions, for instance: 
 How has jihadist online communication (also other than communication 
related to Finland or people having lived in Finland) been covered in Finnish 
mainstream media? 
 How do different Finnish communities understand the significance and extent 
of the phenomenon, especially in relation to persons travelling to Syria and 
Iraq? How do these ideas vary between different population groups?  
 What types of counter-messaging opposed to jihadist communication can be 
found? 
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